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THE WARSAW CONVENTION: JUDICIAL TOLLING
OF THE DEATH KNELL?*
EDWARD CHARLES DEVIvo**
INTRODUCTION
On March 8, 1983, the United States Senate voted against
the ratification of Montreal Protocols 3 and 4.' The Mon-
treal Protocols were an attempt to counterbalance the effects
of the Warsaw Convention, an antiquated treaty imposed
upon virtually all passengers who travel by air in interna-
tional transportation.2 Although they may reach the Senate
floor by way of a vote for reconsideration, 3 the Montreal Pro-
tocols are in a moribund state, as matters now stand.
Originally, the Warsaw Convention's limitation on the
amount of damages recoverable for wrongful death, personal
injury or loss of goods or personal effects was intended to pro-
tect the fledgling aviation industry.' After discussion of the
concept of limited liability at two Conferences, held in Paris
* This article is dedicated to the memory of Walter E. Rutherford.
** J.D., University of Notre Dame Law School, 1978; M.A., New York University,
1982; B.A., New York University, 1975.
, 129 CONG. REC. S2279 (daily ed. March 8, 1983).
2 129 CONG. REC. S2237 (daily ed. March 7, 1983).
Immediately after the vote against ratification was announced, Senate Majority
Leader Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R-Tennessee) who had originally voted in favor of rati-
fication changed his vote to "nay, in order to acquire status to enter a motion to recon-
sider the vote by which the resolution of ratification was defeated." 129 CONG. REC.
S2279-80 (daily ed. March 8, 1983).
4 II Conference International de Droit Prive' Aerien, 4-12 October cited in, 1929
Varsovie 17 (1930) (author trans. 1966) [hereinafter Warsaw Proceedings], as cited in
Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 497, 498, n.5 (1967) [hereinafter Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn]. See also I C.
SHAWCROSS & M. BEAUMONT, AIR LAW 328-29 (Butterworths 4th ed. 1977).
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in 1925 and in Warsaw in 1929,' an international treaty was
drafted and signed by 23 nations6 to provide uniformity to
the terms and conditions of international transportation by
air. Entitled the "Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air,"17 the
treaty became commonly known as the Warsaw Convention
and attained its sovereign status as a formally adopted inter-
national treaty on February 13, 1933.8 Its central underpin-
ning is article 22 which places a maximum ceiling on the
damages recoverable from an air carrier when a passenger
has been injured or killed in international transportation 9 or
when baggage, cargo or personal effects have been damaged,
lost, delayed or destroyed.'0
Although designed to provide much needed uniformity for
Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 498.
6 The United States attended the Paris and Warsaw Conferences merely as an ob-
server. It was not one of the original signatory nations when the Warsaw Convention
was adopted on October 12, 1929, as more fully discussed in Part I, bnfta notes 8, 24-28
and accompanying text.
7 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (1934), reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 1502
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention].
R Pursuant to article 37 of the Warsaw Convention, the treaty was to become
effective:
ninety days after ratification by five of the High Contracting Parties at
the Warsaw Convention (Article 37). France, Poland, and Latvia all
deposited their ratifications on November 15, 1932, joining Spain, Bra-
zil, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, which had previously done so; and on
February 13, 1933, the Convention entered into force. Great Britain and
Italy deposited their ratifications on the following day, and by the end of
1933 twelve countries, including most of the European nations, were
members.
Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 501-02. Today, there are 117 signatory
nations to the Warsaw Convention. The signatories are listed in Commonwealth of Aus-
traha Gazette, May 8, 1979, GIB, at 16.
9 Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 22. Article 22 provides:
(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for
each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs. Where, in
accordance with the law of the court to which the case is submitted,
damages may be awarded in the form of periodical payments, the
equivalent capital value of the said payments shall not exceed 125,000
francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and the passenger
may agree to a higher limit of liability.
Id
The methodology for converting the liability limitation into U.S. dollars is ex-
plained at length in Part IV, infra notes 196-209 and accompanying text.
o Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 22(2), (3), (4). These subsections provide:
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an infant industry, the Warsaw Convention has become an
unjust mechanism that imposes artificial boundaries on an
air crash victim's recovery of just compensation. To soften
and at times blunt the Convention's impact, courts in the
United States have repeatedly attempted to circumvent its
liability limitations by innovatively interpreting the Warsaw
Convention and the Montreal Agreement. 1 The result has
been total disarray in United States case law regarding the
scope of recovery in international aviation disasters. More
significantly, these diverse judicial excursions have not been
met with any meaningful legislative reaction by Congress.12
As promulgated, the Montreal Protocols would have raised
the Convention's monetary limitation from $75,00013 to an
unbreakable boundary near $109,000.14 Prior to the pro-
posed amendment by the Montreal Protocols, the liability
limitation was "breakable" because proof of wilful miscon-
duct, or the failure to give notice to passengers of the liability
(2) In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the liabil-
ity of the carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs per kilogram,
unless the consignor has made, at the time when the package was
handed over to the carrier, a special declaration of the value at delivery
and has paid a supplementary sum if the case so requires. In that case
the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not exceeding the declared sum,
unless he proves that that sum is greater than the actual value to the
consignor at delivery.
(3) As regards objects of which the passenger takes charge himself the
liability of the carrier shall be limited to 5,000 francs per passenger.
(4) The sums mentioned above shall be deemed to refer to the French
franc consisting of 651/2 milligrams of gold at the standard of fineness of
nine hundred thousandths. These sums may be converted into any na-
tional currency in round figures.
Id
See infra notes 13, 51-53, 92-103 and accompanying text.
12 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 13, 339-340 and
accompanying text.
11 The Intercarrier Agreement increased the original ceiling of $8,300 under the
Warsaw Convention to $75,000. The Intercarrier Agreement, as discussed at length in
Part II, infra notes 55-105 and accompanying text, came into effect in May of 1966 and
is commonly known as the Montreal Agreement. The increased limit, as a special
contract under article 22, is subject to the relevant provisions of the Warsaw Conven-
tion. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 4,. at 597.
14 129 CONG. Rzc. S2238-39 (daily ed. March 7, 1983). The actual limit is ex-
pressed as 100,000 special drawing rights which converts roughly to this dollar amount
as of March 8, 1983. For a full explanation of the special drawing rights, see infta notes
202-218 and accompanying text.
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limitation, subjected the carrier to liability for provable dam-
ages without limitation.1 5  The Montreal Protocols would
have eliminated these exceptions and imposed absolute liabil-
ity with a new unbreakable ceiling on recoverable damages. 6
Having languished in the Committee on Foreign Relations
for over seven years, the Montreal Protocols 3 and 4 reached
the Senate for a final vote on March 8, 1983, upon the formal
request for advice and consent to ratification which had been
submitted by President Gerald R. Ford shortly before the end
of his term. 7 Following eight hours of debate on the Senate
floor,'" the arguments against ratification made in the closing
minutes of the debate seemed to best express the impractical-
ity of ratifying legislation which sustains and prolongs anti-
quation. Focusing upon air safety concerns, which could be
compromised seriously by the Montreal Protocols' elimina-
tion of the "wilful misconduct" exception, one senator criti-
cized the effort to revitalize the scope and intent of the
original Warsaw system of liability as susceptible t6 further
debilitation by adoption of the quasi-modern legislation.' 9
,, 129 CONG. REG. S2245-46 (daily ed. March 7, 1983). See Warsaw Convention,
supra note 7, art. 25.
'1 129 Cong. Rec. S2245-46 (daily ed. March 7, 1983). See Warsaw Convention,
supra note 7, art. 25.
'1 Letter from President Gerald R. Ford to the Honorable Senator Howard H.
Baker, Jr. (June 16, 1982),reprthtedth 129 CONG. REC. S2237 (daily ed. March 7, 1983).
, The complete text of the Senate debate is in the March 7 and 8, 1983, transcripts
of the Congressional Record, 98th Congress, First Session, 129 CONG. REC. S2235-2262
(daily ed. March 7, 1983) and S2270-2279 (daily ed. March 8, 1983) respectively.
See also REPORT OF THE COMMIrIEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, S. EXEC. REP. No.
45, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1981). In this Report, the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee supported the position taken by the Ford, Carter and Reagan administrations
for ratification of the Montreal Protocols. Vice President George Bush presided at the
vote on the Protocols in the Senate on March 8, 1983, lending visible support to their
ratification by the Reagan administration.
,!, 129 CONG. REC. S2278 (daily ed. March 8, 1983) (remarks of Senator Biden).
The Senator stated:
Finally, I think my colleagues should consider the possibility that the
protocols constitute an elaborate game of risk-shifting. For example, a
recent case in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit [,n re Atr
Crash in Bah'lIndonesia, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982), dicussed infa notes
278-342 and accompanying text] held that survivors of passengers killed
in an airline crash have a right to compensation from the U.S. Govern-
ment, under the Tucker Act, if their claims for full compensation against
an airline have been unreasonably impaired by the Warsaw Conven-
WARSAW CONVENTION
The legislative and executive input to modernize the War-
saw Convention has been limited strictly to the proposal for
ratification of the Montreal Protocols. There have been no
efforts toward legislation which would maintain uniformity
and allow for flexibility as well. The need to break from the
present system of uniformity under the Warsaw Convention
most obviously resides in the limitation of liability provision.
Any effective revision of the Warsaw Convention must pro-
vide for the abandonment of this limitation because it works
to the detriment of passengers of the United States vis-a-vis
those of other signatory nations. In the course of the debate
over the Montreal Protocols, one United States Senator ex-
pressed concern that the low liability limitation would injure
the American traveling public.2°
The Warsaw Convention has lost its vitality. Its develop-
ment has run the gamut from the paternalism of its drafters
to those who now propose to sustain it by artificial means,
such as the ineffective higher monetary ceiling contained in
the Montreal Protocols. What is needed, as the history and
the United States' case law of the Convention clearly demon-
strate, is a new system which abandons all liability limita-
tions and realizes that new monetary ceilings belabor the
antiquity of an outdated system. As long as the door to Capi-
tol Hill remains closed to proposals for changing the Conven-
tion, the courts in the United States will continue to find new
ways to avoid application of the liability limitation and,
thereby, slowly toll the death knell of the Warsaw
Convention.
tion's liability limitation. What this means is that the U.S. Govern-
ment's financial exposure would be increased if the protocols go into
effect . . . [S]ince manufacturers are not covered by the Warsaw Con-
vention, victims would probably sue manufacturers if they are dissatis-
fied with their limited recovery.
Id
20 129 CONG. REC. S2250 (daily ed. March 8, 1983) (remarks of Senator Hollings
stating "proponents [of the Protocols] acclaim the treaties for their importance in
maintaining our national prestige as the international leader in aviation. We will be-
come the international leader in a ripoff of the American traveling public").
1983]
76 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
PART I
THE HISTORY OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
A. Hsory.
In an effort to mesh two goals, namely to provide some
uniformity to the liability rules applicable to claims arising
out of international transportation by air and to limit the po-
tential liability of air carriers in the event of accidents, the
Warsaw Convention originally provided that an airline
would be liable for damages sustained by a passenger in the
course of a flight or while embarking or disembarking2" up to
a monetary limit of approximately $8,300.2 As a counterbal-
ance to this monetary limitation of liability, the Warsaw
Convention shifted the burden of proof such that the carrier
was presumed liable for the damages alleged to have oc-
curred on board the aircraft or in the course of embarking or
disembarking. The carrier, however, would be given the op-
portunity to avoid liability by proving that it had ,taken all
necessary measures to avoid the damages or that it was im-
possible to do so.23
The United States was merely an observer to the original
2, Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 17. Article 17 of the Convention reads as
follows:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death
or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a pas-
senger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place
on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embark-
ing or disembarking.
Id. For judicial interpretation of what constitutes "embarkation" and its counterpart,
see Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977), rev', 369 F.
Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Day v. Trans World Airlines, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1955),
afg, 393 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y.).
22 Warsaw Proceedings, supra note 4, at 224-25.
23 Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 20. Article 20 provides:
(1) The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents
have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was
impossible for him or them to take such measures.
(2) In the transportation of goods and baggage the carrier shall not be
liable if he proves that the damage was occasioned by an error in pilot-
ing, in the handling of the aircraft, or in navigation and that, in all other
respects, he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid
the damage.
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conferences leading up to the creation of the Warsaw Con-
vention in 1929 and its consummation in 1933.24 Although
the United States was not one of the creators of the treaty,
article 38 of the Convention permitted subsequent adoption
of the Warsaw Convention. 25 In November, 1933, the Com-
merce Department and the State Department, recognizing
the utility of the United States' participation in the Conven-
tion, recommended to President Roosevelt that the treaty be
adopted by the United States. 26  President Roosevelt ac-
cepted the recommendation and submitted the treaty to the
Senate where, on June 15, 1934, the Warsaw Convention re-
ceived the necessary "Advice and Consent" by voice vote.2 7
Hence, while the United States had no input in formulation
of the Warsaw Convention, the United States adopted the
treaty shortly after it went into effect.28
Both historical and economic considerations caused the
Convention's monetary limitation to be reconsidered periodi-
cally. InSeptember, 1955, a diplomatic conference was con-
vened at the Hague to consider the status of the Warsaw
Convention.2 9 The Hague Conference was the culmination
of several years of extensive research devoted to revising the
Convention. ° Immediately after World War II the issue of
revision was referred to the Comite International Technique
d'Experts Juridiques Aeriens (CITEJA) by the Provisional
-1 Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 502.
2r, Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 38. Article 38 of the Warsaw Convention
provides as follows:
(1) This convention shall, after it has come into force, remain open for
adherence by any state.
(2) The adherence shall be effected by a notification addressed to the
Government of the Republic of Poland, which shall inform the Govern-
ment of each of the High Contracting Parties thereof.
(3) The adherence shall take effect as from the ninetieth day after the
notification made to the Government of the Republic of Poland.
Id.
.' Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 502.
27 78 CONG. REC. 11,582 (1934).
Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 501-03.
2 ICAO INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AIR LAw (1955) (Doc. No.
7686-LC/140) [hereinafter cited as HAGUE PROCEEDINGS].
:1 Id.
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International Civil Aviation Organization." Because the
CITEJA was dissolved in 1947, the Legal Committee of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) continued
this study. As a result of discussions in the Legal Committee,
several draft conventions were formulated during the years
1948 through 1951.32 In January, 1952, a special subcommit-
tee appointed by the ICAO Legal Committee drafted at Paris
a completely new convention to replace the Warsaw Conven-
tion in its entirety. 33
Prior to convening at the Hague, the ICAO Legal Com-
mittee gave serious consideration to utilizing the Paris draft
as the new starting ground for rewriting and replacing the
original Convention.3 4 After extensive debate in the commit-
tee, however, it was determined that the more practical and
expedient manner in which to proceed was to conform the
existing Warsaw Convention to the contemplated revisions
rather than to work from the 1952 Paris draft. 5
Having decided to work from the Warsaw Convention it-
self rather than the draft prepared in Paris in 1952, two ma-
jor considerations became the focal point of the Hague
Conference: 1) an increase in the monetary value of the lia-
bility limitation, and 2) a modification of article 25 relating
to the "wilful misconduct" exception.3 6 The proposal which





Id. The Hague Proceedings noted:
Therefore while recognizing the unquestionable value of the draft for-
mulated at Paris by its [ICAO Legal Committee's] sub-committee and of
the preparatory and exploratory work undertaken by its rapporteur,
Major K.M. Beaumont, particularly inasmuch as that draft represented
a systematic rearrangement, including drafting improvements, of the
contents of the Warsaw Convention and included also fresh treatment of
certain subjects, the Committee decided that the object of effecting only
limited necessary amendments would be better achieved by taking as the
bases of its discussions the Warsaw Convention itself rather than the
Paris draft.
Id
ICAO Legal Committee, Report on the Revision of the Warsaw Convention, in 2 HAGUE
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 29, at 96-99.
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limitation from $8,300 to $13,300. 37 The United States had
attempted to raise the limit to $25,000.38 By compromise, it
was agreed to double the originally established $8,300 ceiling
and establish a new limitation of liability in the amount of
$16,600.39
Although the United States signed the Hague Protocol, ten
years elapsed without the President of the United States or
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee taking a firm stand
on ratification.4 ° Opponents of the Warsaw Convention were
not mollified by the doubling of the $8,300 ceiling established
by the original Warsaw Convention.4" In June, 1961, the
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee wrote
to the new Secretary of State regarding the hiatus over
Hague ratification:
[The Hague] Protocol was referred to the Committee on For-
eign Relations on July 24, 1959, and as of this date, the Exec-
utive Branch has shown little interest in it. I should like to
learn, therefore, whether the Department of State would want
the Committee on Foreign Relations to act on the Protocol
during this session of the Congress. If not, I would be inter-
ested in learning the reasons why the Department of State
does not desire Committee action on the Protocol at this
42time.
The receipt of the letter by the Department of State
prompted a new look at the Hague Protocol. Consequently,
Id. at 76-81, 93-100.
I ICAO Legal Committee, Minutes 9th Sess. 1953, at 162-63, 270 (ICAO Doc.
No. 7450 -LC/126) (1954).
Id. at 270.
0 Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn,supra note 4, at 515-16. The United States was grap-
pling with the concept of limited liability when death or injury occurred even after it
had agreed to the accord reached at the Hague in 1955. The United States did not
sign the Hague Protocol at the Conference, demonstrating its equivocation despite its
acknowledgement of the Protocol's increase of the monetary ceiling on recoverable
damages. It is unknown to what extent the tragedy over Medicine Bow Peak, Wyo-
ming in October, 1955, killing members of the Mormon Tabernacle Choir, captured
the minds and hearts of those who originally favored the United States' adherence to
the Hague Protocol. Id
- Id at 510.
- Letter from Senator J.W. Fulbright to Secretary of State Rusk (June 12, 1961),
refirred to in Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 516 n.73.
19831
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the Kennedy administration introduced domestic legislation,
under which air carriers would be compelled to insure pas-
sengers at a higher monetary level. 43 The Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee thereafter left no doubt as to where it
stood, stating that the Warsaw Convention liability limita-
tion was an "extremely inadequate amount of compensation"
and further that "even the $16,600 limitation . . .is highly
inadequate by U.S. standards."'44 It called for complemen-
tary insurance legislation for protection of up to $76,000.45
After lengthy debate in Congress concerning the insurance
legislation, it became evident that there was little chance of
its enactment. Automatic recovery through compulsory in-
surance projected serious concern over the potential for air-
craft sabotage and became the gravamen of the controversy
over the Hague Protocol in 1964 at hearings before a special
committee composed of representatives of the State Depart-
ment, the Justice Department, the CAB and the FAA:
The argument was that an automatic recovery of 50,000 dol-
lars was 'an invitation to sabotage,' not only in less developed
countries where this could be a 'king's ransom,' but even in
the United States. Unlike trip insurance or large amounts of
life insurance purchased shortly before a flight, there could be
no record that could lead to identification of a saboteur.46
In fact, the issue had gained such momentum that neither
the Senate nor the House of Representatives would call for a
hearing on the Hague Protocol.47  As the opposition
mounted, so did the United States' unhappiness with the un-
realistic monetary limitation. Hence, in an atmosphere of in-
creasing dissatisfaction,48 the executive branch of the United
States government denounced the Warsaw Convention on
1' See Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 533-41.
44 Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 545-46, citing SENATE COMM. ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, HAGUE PROTOCOL TO WARSAW CONVENTION, S. EXEC. REP.
No. 3, 89th Cong., ist Sess. 9-10 (1966)).
41 Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 545-46, citing SENATE COMM. ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, HAGUE PROTOCOL TO WARSAW CONVENTION, S. EXEC. REP.
No. 3, 89th Cong., ist Sess. 6-7 (1966)).




November 15, 1965, to become effective six months from that
date, on May 15, 1966." 9
A chasm thus emerged between the United States and the
rest of the world over the limitation on liability in interna-
tional air transportation accidents. On the same date that
the formal notice of denunciation was deposited by the
United States, the Department of State issued a press release
indicating that the United States would continue its adher-
ence to the Warsaw Convention provided that an interna-
tional agreement limiting liability to approximately $100,000
could be reached. The Department of State further stipu-
lated that pending the adoption of such an international
agreement, there be a provisional arrangement among the
principal international airlines waiving the limits of liability
up to $75,000 per passenger.5"
Under the impetus of the United States' denunciation of
the Warsaw Convention, the ICAO held a conference in
Montreal in February, 1966 in an effort to fulfill the United
States Department of State's proviso.5' While the Montreal
conference proved inconclusive and the May 15, 1966 denun-
ciation date for the United States was drawing closer, domes-
tic and international air carriers reconsidered interim
measures which they had, on previous occasions, found to be
unacceptable. As a result, the carriers agreed to a monetary
liability limitation in the amount of $75,000 without regard
to fault on the part of the carrier (the Montreal Agree-
ment).52 The United States government, as a result of this
interim resolution, withdrew its denunciation of the Warsaw
Convention on May 13, and gave its approval to the Mon-
treal Agreement of 1966,53 which became effective on May
15, 1966.54
49 Department ofState Press Release No. 268, 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 923-25 (1965).
Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 552. The Department of State re-
leased the proviso on November 15, 1965.
12 IATA Agreement Re Liability Limitations, 44 C.A.B. 819-20 (1966).
r,:, Department ofState Press Release No. 111, May 14, 1966, 54 DEP'T ST. BULL. 956-57
(1966).
T" IATA Agreement Re Liability Limitations, 44 C.A.B. 820 (1966).
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B. Concluding Remarks.
The new Montreal Agreement posed a problem for the
courts of the United States as they attempted to relate its in-
terim contractual status to the terms of the Warsaw Conven-
tion. Judicial examination of the Montreal Agreement
involved serious consideration of whether the inter-carrier
agreement modified, supplemented, amended or paralleled
the Warsaw Convention. The conclusions reached by the
courts often evidence a growing concern with the unfairness
of the liability limitation to United States passengers. The
chasm between the United States and the rest of the world
which emerged when the United States threatened to with-
draw from the Warsaw Convention in 1965 was widened by
the introduction of the Montreal Agreement and the judicial
reception it encountered.
PART II
THE TRANSITION FROM THE TREATY PROVISIONS
TO THE JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF THEIR
MEANING
A. Judicial Interpretation.
According to the terms of the Warsaw Convention, there
are two ways to avoid the application of the liability limita-
tions of article 22. First, a plaintiff may attempt to prove that
the "delivery ' 55 of a ticket pursuant to the requirements of
article 3 has not been accomplished. Second, the plaintiff can
prove "wilful misconduct" on the part of the carrier56 pursu-
' The term "delivery" is not specifically defined in the Warsaw Convention. Courts
have derived its definition(s) by interpreting article 3 of the treaty. See i'ylra notes 63-77
and accompanying text. See also Manion v. Pan Am. World Airways, 55 N.Y.2d 398
(1982) and cases discussed therein. In Manion, New York State's highest court held
that the carrier could not avail itself of the liability limitation because no ticket was
delivered to the passenger at the outset of her international journey in New York.
Plaintiff was injured on the second portion of the journey in Rome where the ticket
had been delivered to her.
% The wilful misconduct exception to the liability limitation under article 25 of the
Warsaw Convention has been a cause of concern and extensive debate throughout the
history of the Convention. As originally written in the French draft of the treaty, the
carrier could not invoke the provisions of the Convention which exclude or limit its
liability if the damage was caused by "dol" or by such default on his part as, in accord-
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ant to article 25. In both instances, the sanction is the same;
there is no ceiling on the amount of damages which the plain-
tiff can be awarded, and the carrier is deprived of all Conven-
tion defenses to liability. The reason for these two exceptions
to the liability limitation is to serve as a stop-gap measure
against placing passengers at an inherent disadvantage. In
practical terms, the two exceptions are invoked first to pro-
vide adequate notice to the passenger of the limitation on the
carrier's liability (article 3)57 and secondly, to distinguish be-
tween the conduct to which the monetary ceiling applies and
that conduct which may warrant the imposition of punitive
or exemplary damages against an airline (article 25).58
These are the only two vehicles to escape the liability limi-
tation explicitly provided by the Convention. The latter ve-
hicle, proof of wilful misconduct, has generated few pro-
plaintiff judicial decisions. This is due to the plaintiff's diffi-
cult burden of proving the elements which constitute wilful
misconduct. 59  Consequently, the lion's share of judicial cir-
ance with the law of the court seized of the case, is considered to be equivalent to
"dol". The nearest equivalent to this term in the English language has been established
as "wilful misconduct" but even this translation does not completely coincide with the
concept of "dol". As is the case with the use of the term "delivery" under article 3 of
the Warsaw Convention, the "wilful misconduct" exception under article 25 is not
specifically defined in the terms of the treaty itself. What constitutes wilful misconduct
is a factual issue on a case by case basis. See injfra note 59; see also HAGUE PROCEED-
INGS, supra note 29, at 97-99.
57 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
- See supra note 55; infia note 59 and accompanying text.
59 See In re Pago Pago Aircrash of January 30, 1974, No. 78-3591, slip op. (9th Cir.
1982); LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 832
U.S. 878 (1965); Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, 346 F.2d 532 (2d
Cir. 1965), rev', 219 F. Supp. 289 (1963), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966); KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines Holland v. Tuller, 292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921
(1961); Grey v. American Airlines, 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
989 (1956); Pekelis v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.),cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951); American Airlines v. Ulen, 186 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949);
Hill v. United Airlines, 550 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Kan. 1982); Tarar v. Pakistan Int'l
Airlines, 554 F. Supp. 471 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
In In re Pago Pago Aircrash ofJanua y 30, 1974, a Boeing 707 aircraft crashed on Amer-
ican Samoa, killing ninety-seven persons including all members of the flight crew. The
record reflected evidence that the aircraft descended too quickly, was flying too low
and too fast and that the crew failed to use proper callout and instrument checking
procedures during the runway landing approach. The district court held that the
question of wilful misconduct was a question for the jury and accordingly allowed into
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cumvention of article 22 has emerged through a varied anal-
evidence facts pertaining to the flight crew's conduct. 419 F. Supp. 1158, 1160 (C.D.
Cal. 1976). The Ninth Circuit held that thejury could properly find from the evidence
that the flight crew's conduct not only constituted negligence but that taken cumula-
tively, the crew's errors could be found to have constituted wilful misconduct. No. 78-
3591, slip op. (9th Cir. 1982).
In LeRoy o. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, a jury finding of wilful misconduct rested
upon deductions from indirect evidence concerning the flight crew's missed approach
and crash into a mountain northeast of the city of Rome. Since the inferences required
to be drawn in order to find Sabena guilty of wilful misconduct were reasonable, the
court of appeals held that the jury's finding must not be overturned. 344 F.2d at 268-
75.
In Berner v. Bitish Commonwealth Pacifw Airlines, the district court granted the plain-
tiffs' motion for a directed verdict, thereby finding that the pilot's failure to follow
instructions to maintain a certain altitude over a radio signal station constituted wilful
misconduct. The court reasoned that even though the pilot did not intend the fatal
crash near Half Moon Bay, California, his conduct constituted recklessness and this
was sufficient to invoke the "wilful misconduct" exception to the treaty liability limita-
tions. 219 F. Supp. at 324-26. On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the directed
verdict for plaintiffs and held that there was evidence from which the jury properly
could have inferred that the pilot thought he was bringing the aircraft down at the
proper location. 346 F.2d at 537-38. The appellate court stated that once the case
went to the jury, its verdict should not have been upset if reasonable men could find in
defendant's favor, as they could have done in Berner. Id at 538.
In Koninklyke Luchtvaart Mattschappy N V KLM Royal Dutch Airhnes Holland v. Tuller,
Circuit Judge Burger affirmed the district court's decision that there was sufficient
evidence to find KLM and its ground agent guilty of wilful misconduct. The aircraft
crashed in the tidewaters of the Shannon River approximately one minute after its
takeoff from the airport in Shannon, Ireland. KLM's failure to properly instruct pas-
sengers of the location of life vests and their use, failure to broadcast an emergency
message, failure to provide for the safety of the plaintiff after his peril was known, and
the failure of KLM's ground agent to monitor radio messages and initiate rescue proce-
dures precluded the invocation of the Warsaw liability limitation. 292 F.2d at 779-82.
In Grey v. American Airlines, recovery was sought exclusive of the Warsaw limitation
when an American Airlines flight crashed near Dallas, Texas on November 29, 1949.
At trial, evidence showed that one of the engines backfired and forced the aircraft to
seek clearance to land in Dallas. The jury found that miscommunication in the cock-
pit occurred between the time the aircraft crossed the boundary of the airport at an
altitude of 200 feet and the time it crashed on top of the hangar of the Dallas Aviation
School. The jury further found that the disaster was due to wilful misconduct. 95 F.
Supp. at 456. The trial court granted American Airlines' motions to set aside the ver-
dict and directed judgment in favor of the plaintiffs pursuant to the Warsaw limita-
tion. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the directed verdict. Id
In Pekels v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Circuit Judge Augustus Hand reversed
the Southern District of New York's ruling which upheld the $8,300 maximum recov-
erable damages for the death of a passenger who was killed enroute to Shannon, Ire-
land on December 28, 1946. The underlying basis for the Second Circuit's reversal was
the exclusion of the findings of various inquiry boards. These findings documented a
faulty altimeter on the aircraft, thereby properly giving rise to jury instructions that
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ysis of what constitutes adequate "delivery" of a passenger
ticket under article 3.
Article 3(1) of the Warsaw Convention requires that the
passenger ticket contain certain information.' Article 3(2)
one of TWA's mechanics intentionally omitted to perform a necessary safety check.
187 F.2d at 126-31.
In American Ai'rlhnes v. Ulen, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed the district court's ruling that the carrier's charter operation of a flight from
Washington, D.C. to Mexico City flew at improper altitude and crashed into Glade
Mountain in Southwest Virginia. The evidence established wilful misconduct on the
part of the flight crew where the plan called for flight at an altitude of 4,000 feet within
one and one half miles of a mountain which was 4,080 feet high. The Warsaw Conven-
tion limitation was deemed inapplicable. 186 F.2d at 534.
Finally, there are two federal court decisions in which wilful misconduct was found
against the carrier; however, neither of the incidents involved operational acts or omis-
sions concerning the flight itself. These do not typify article 25 cases. First, in Hi'll V,
United.Airhnes, the plaintiffs had reservations on United to travel from Kansas City to
Denver to Seattle, where they planned to depart for the Orient on Northwest Airlines.
Once airborne on the Kansas City-Denver leg, United announced that inclement
weather in Seattle led to cancellation of the Denver-Seattle flight. Rerouting from
Denver to Seattle through Portland, on the advice of a United ticket agent, plaintiffs
discovered in flight that the Seattle airport had been opened. When they ultimately
arrived in Seattle, plaintiffs learned that they not only missed their Northwest flight to
Tokyo but also that United did not have the proper equipment in Denver to meet its
scheduled Denver-Seattle flight. 530 F. Supp. at 1050. In a rather twisted interpreta-
tion of the Warsaw Convention, the district court first held that its terms applied to the
facts before the court and then assimilated the plaintiffs' assertion of intentional mis-
representation to "wilful misconduct" under Warsaw. The language of article 25, the
court said, is broad enough to encompass intentional misrepresentation when it arises
in international transportation. Id. at 1055. The court, therefore, denied the defend-
ant's motion for a determination of the applicable law and for judgment thereon. Id
at 1056.
The second "Warsaw" case not based on operational conduct is Tarar v. Pakistan
International Azrhes. In Tarar, the family of Feroze Tarar sued the airline for failing to
properly transport the human remains of the decedent to his homeland in accordance
with the family's Islamic religious beliefs. Among the various plaintiffs' family mem-
bers, only decedent's son entered into the contract for carriage of the casket from Hous-
ton, Texas to Lahore, Pakistan. Thus, only his claim for damages invoked the
provisions of the Warsaw Convention, while all other plaintiffs' recoverable damages
were governed by Texas law. 554 F. Supp. at 478-79. With respect to the son's claim
for damages under the Warsaw Convention, the court held that the carrier intention-
ally refused to load the human remains of the decedent aboard the agreed upon flight
to Pakistan. Wilful misconduct was therefore established. Id The court's characteri-
zation of the case as a "Warsaw" case stemmed from its interpretation of article one of
the Convention. Under article one, the treaty applies to "all international transporta-
tion of persons, baggage, or goods." Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 1. Despite
its admission that human remains are neither "person, baggage, or goods," the court
found the case to fall within the ambit of the Convention. 554 F. Supp. at 478-79.
"I Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 3(1). Article 3(1) provides:
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provides for the imposition of absolute and unlimited liability
if the airline accepts a passenger without delivering such a
ticket to a passenger. 6' Read literally, article 3(2) provides
that the Warsaw Convention limitations of liability apply
even if the ticket does not contain a statement that the trans-
portation is governed by the Convention. Under the literal
language of article 3 the liability limitation is inapplicable
only when no ticket has been delivered. The only require-
ment within the context of the Warsaw Convention is to pro-
vide "notice" of the liability limitation such that the
passenger ticket contains a statement that the transportation
is subject to the Convention's rules relating to liability.62
United States courts have not, however, read the provisions
of article 3 literally in the context of a "delivery" issue.
Hence, what has emerged is the judiciary's autonomous crea-
tion of notice and delivery requirements which are not con-
tained anywhere in the language of the Warsaw Convention
itself.
This protracted interpretation of article 3 is exemplified by
three federal court decisions which emerged in the mid-
1960's. In Mertens v. F!'ytng Tiger Line,63 the Second Circuit
For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver a passenger
ticket which shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may reserve
the right to alter the stopping places in case of necessity, and that if he
exercises that right, the alteration shall not have the effect of depriving
the transportation of its international character;
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating
to liability established by this convention.
Id.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 3(2). Article 3(2) provides:
The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall not affect
the existence or the validity of the contract of transportation, which shall
nonetheless be subject to the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if the
carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket having been deliv-
ered he shall not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of this
convention which exclude or limit his liability.
Id
'I See Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 3(l)(e).
341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965).
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held that "delivery" of the ticket while the passenger was on
board the aircraft was not timely within the meaning of arti-
cle 3(2) of the Warsaw Convention.64 Article 3(2) was read to
require reasonable delivery "in such a manner as to afford
him [the passenger] a reasonable opportunity to take meas-
ures to protect himself against the limitation of liability. '"65
Such a reasonable opportunity, for example, would provide
the passenger with sufficient time prior to boarding the air-
craft to procure additional insurance.66
In Warren v. Flying Tiger Line,67 the Ninth Circuit agreed
with the Mertens decision, emphasizing the quasi-treaty re-
quirements for delivery of a passenger ticket.' The Ninth
Circuit found an implied requirement under article 3(2) that
delivery of the passenger ticket be made sufficiently in ad-
vance of the flight so that a passenger may, if he desires, ob-
tain additional insurance protection. 69 The passengers were
deprived thereby of a right which was intended to be con-
comitant with the carrier's "right" to limit its liability.7"
While neither Mertens nor Warren dealt with the adequacy
of a ticket's type size, a third case, Lisi v. Alitah'a-Linee Aeree
Itahane, SPA., " looked beyond the physical delivery require-
ments under article 3, and held that the ticket must also con-
tain sufficient notice of the limitation of liability in a size of
print that is readable, regardless of whether the ticket was
delivered six months in advance of the flight.7" Despite the
literal reading of article 3(2) requiring only "delivery" of a
ticket, the Second Circuit in Lisi interpreted the Warsaw
Convention to transcend the "timeliness" criterion and fur-
ther require adequate notice on the ticket of the applicability
- 341 F.2d at 856-57.
- Id. at 856.
- Id. at 856-57.
7 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965).
- Id at 497.
, Id at 498.
70 Id.
7 253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y.), afd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aft'd, 390 U.S. 455
(1968) (an equally divided court; without opinion).
72 Id
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of the Convention's liability limitation.7 3
The key to understanding the Lisi decision is found in a
footnote to the district court's opinion.14  The issue was no
longer adequate "delivery" of the ticket but whether that
ticket gave legible notice of the liability limitations. The ap-
pellate court quoted from the district court's reasoning: " 'Lil-
liputian typography' which must be read through 'a
magnifying glass' is at war with the intent of the Conven-
tion."75 Concededly, timely delivery of the ticket under arti-
cle 3(1) had been satisfied in Lis', and the carrier therefore
had the right to avail itself of the treaty's exculpatory de-
fenses. Nevertheless, the district court equated timely deliv-
ery of a ticket containing unreadable notice with non-
delivery under article 3(2) and thereby reasoned that the arti-
cle 3(2) sanction of absolute liability was justifiably imposed
upon the air carrier.76 The trial court's language implicitly
acknowledged that "delivery" had, in fact, occurred and that
the sanction of unlimited liability could not be based upon
the absence of delivery under article 3(2)."
Oddly enough, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) had al-
ready promulgated a regulation in 1963 by the time the lower
court had decided Lis', which specified that notice of the lia-
bility limitation had to be printed in a specified type size.78
The CAB promulgated sua sponte this regulation, which only
came to light three years later when the inter-carrier agree-
ment was reached in Montreal.7 9 Because article 3 did not
provide what these cases attributed to it, the CAB added its
,. 370 F.2d at 513-14.
14 253 F. Supp. at 243, 243 n.7.
Ir, Id at 243. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
granting of plaintiffs' motion but did not specify what size print would be required to
render the "delivery" of the ticket in compliance with the "notice" concept. The court
merely stated that the notice must be "adequate". 370 F.2d at 513.
76 253 F. Supp. at 239-40.
" Id The trial court stated, "We are of the opinion that a jury could not reasonably
find that the passenger tickets and baggage checks dehvered here notified the passengers
• ..and accordingly hold as a matter of law that defendant cannot exclude or limit its
liability under the [Warsaw] Convention." Id. (emphasis added).
7 28 Fed. Reg. 11,775, 11,777 (1963).
19 The CAB regulation proposed on April 1, 1963 contained a type size specification
for purposes which the CAB clearly enunciated:
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new type size provision to require that simultaneous with de-
livery of the ticket the passenger be furnished a written state-
ment entitled "Advice to International Passengers on
Limitation of Liability."80
The newly adopted section 221.175 of the CAB Economic
Regulations specified, in part, that "[t]he statement [i.e., Ad-
vice of the Article 22 limitation under Warsaw] prescribed
herein shall be printed in type at least as large as ten point
The Warsaw Convention requires that the passenger be given a ticket
containing a statement that the transportation is subject to the rules re-
lating to liability established by the Convention. The carriers comply
with this requirement by a notice in small print on the face of the ticket
reading as follows: "If the passenger's journey involves an ultimate desti-
nation or stop in a country other than the country of departure, the
Warsaw Convention may be applicable and the Convention governs and
in most cases limits the liability of carriers for death or personal injury
and in respect of loss of or damage to baggage.
It appears to the Board that this notice may be inadequate in two
major respects: First, the ticket is by no means the most effective instru-
ment for advising a passenger of a limitation of liability. There can be
no assurance that a passenger will read his ticket at all or if he does, that
he will read it under such circumstances as will enable him to realize the
significance of the notice provision and take such protective action as his
circumstances require. The type in which the notice is currently printed
on the ticket is too small to alert the passengers to the importance of the
matter. Second, the fact of greatest significance to the passenger,
namely, the amount of the limitation on liability for death or injury does
not appear in the notice.
28 Fed. Reg. 3281, 3282 (1963). In the same regulatory proposal, the CAB commented
that the selected 10 point modern type for the draft regulation (28 Fed. Reg. 3283) was
"substantially larger than the notice presently appearing on the tickets." Id. The
Board obviously was responding to the type size condemned by the Second Circuit in
Lisi. See supra notes 71-77.
The "Advice to International Passengers on Limitation of Liability" states:
Passengers embarking upon a journey involving an ultimate destina-
tion or a stop in a country other than the country of departure are ad-
vised that the provisions of a treaty known as the Warsaw Convention
may be applicable to their entire journey including the portion entirely
within the countries of departure and destination. The Convention gov-
erns and in most cases limits personal liability to approximately $8,290
and limits liability for loss of damage to baggage.
Additional protection can usually be obtained by purchasing insur-
ance from a private company. Such insurance is not affected by limita-
tion of the carrier's liability under the Warsaw Convention. For further
information please consult your airline or insurance company
representative. •
28 Fed. Reg. 11,775, 11,777 (1963).
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modern type." '' Theoretically, the CAB was supplementing
the requirement of article 3 "delivery" under the Warsaw
Convention.82 Although the Montreal Agreement was not
yet conceived in 1963, the CAB economic regulation was
clearly the genesis of the 10 point modern type specification
subsequently adopted as part of the Montreal Agreement in
May, 1966. In fact, from the comments of the CAB it can be
argued that the CAB had predicted the emergence of the
Montreal Agreement type of special contract permitted by
article 22(4) of the Warsaw Convention.83
Ironically, the final version of the inter-carrier pact which
became the Montreal Agreement never defined the meaning
of "10 point modern type," nor did it describe a specific type
face in lieu of type size which would be measured by lines per
inch.84 Rather the type size requirement is merely alluded to
in the history of the Montreal Agreement once. The Agree-
ment states that "on May 4 details of the arrangement (in-
cluding a notice to each passenger in quite large type) were
worked out in an all day negotiating and drafting session in
Montreal. '85 Moreover, there is no definition or technical re-
quirement for that specification in the CAB regulations or
the CAB Order approving the Montreal Agreement.86
Hence, combined with the judicial "re-write" of article 3 of
the Warsaw Convention, the CAB's failure to define the type
size which was adopted as part of the Montreal Agreement
8 28 Fed. Reg. 11,777 (1963) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 221.175).
82 See supra note 79.
a, 28 Fed. Reg. 3,282 (1963) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 221). Article 22(4)
provides:
Carriers may if they are so disposed, enter a special contract providing
for a higher liability than the limit provided in the [Warsaw] Conven-
tion. Such a contract could be effectuated by an appropriate tariff pro-
vision making it part of the transportation contract .... Specifically,
it is proposed to require inclusion in all tariffs of a brief statement as to
the applicability and effect of the Warsaw Convention including the
amount of the limit in dollars.
Id
Agreement CAB 18,900, approved by Order E-23680, May 13, 1966, (Docket
17325), 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
8 Id.
28 Fed. Reg. 11,777 (1963); 28 Fed. Reg. 3,282 (1963); 31 Fed. Reg. 7,302 (1966).
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served as the precursor to further judicial excursions away
from the literal application of the terms of the treaty."7 Arti-
cle 3 of the Warsaw Convention would subsequently become
a revolving door through which the courts could continually
usher out the liability limitation.
With the 10 point type specification promulgated and ap-
proved, but nowhere explained, the post-Montreal Agree-
ment cases raise an important question as to the real
significance to be attached to the undefined type size. In Mil-
liken Trust Co. v. Iberia Lineas Aereas De Espana SA.,8 ' the
Supreme Court of New York County held that 8 point type
was acceptable because it was "easily readable" and because
the CAB in its regulation "did not profess to be codifying or
in any way determining what size type may be required by
the Warsaw Convention. "89 In Ludecke v. Canadian Pacific Ai'r-
hnes, 9 the Supreme Court of Canada held that 4.5 point size
was such type and arrangement "as to be legible by the ordi-
nary person using ordinary diligence."'
Thus, after judicial scrutiny of the Montreal Agreement,
the central underpinning of the inter-carrier agreement did
not emerge as the type size of the notice of limitation on the
passenger ticket. The United States' real concern with the
Agreement was, instead, the limitation of recoverable dam-
ages as expressed under article 22 of the Warsaw Convention.
The legislative history behind the Montreal Agreement evi-
dences the United States' grave concern about the Warsaw
Convention and its liability limitation.
Concurrent with its notice of denunciation of the Warsaw
Convention in 1965, the United States set forth the condi-
tions under which it was prepared to withdraw the notice of
denunciation, which included both a "reasonable prospect"
of an international agreement limiting liability to approxi-
See inra notes 107-163 and accompanying text.
" 11 Av. Cas. 17,331 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969), aft'd, 36 A.D.2d 582 (N.Y. 1971).
11 Av. Cas. at 17,332.
12 Av. Cas. 17,191 (Que. Superior Ct. 1971), affdin part on other grounds and rev'd in
part, 53 D.L.R.3d 636 (Que. C.A. 1974), afdon other grounds, 98 D.L.R.3d 52 (Can. S.
Ct. 1979).
1, Ludecke v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, 98 D.L.R.3d 52, 58 (Can. S. Ct. 1979).
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mately $100,000 per passenger and a provisional interna-
tional liability limit of $75,000 per passenger.92 Accordingly,
the Montreal Conference convened on February 1, 1966, to
consider the conditions proposed by the United States. After
two weeks of debate, however, neither the conditions pro-
posed by the State Department nor a compromise solution
based on those conditions appeared to be forthcoming.93
Shortly thereafter, the President of the Council of the ICAO
wrote to the United States Government and suggested that
perhaps the conditions proposed by the United States could
be met, at least in part. This action was motivated by the
fact that many of the signatory countries began to realize
more fully the implications of the United States'
denunciation.94
However, the attempt by the ICAO Council President to
revive U.S. interest proved difficult, just as the reaction of the
United States to the prospect of limited liability had been
unfavorably displayed at the Hague in 1955. By focusing
upon the United States' indication in 1965 that an increase of
liability limitation to $75,000 would be acceptable,95 the
Council President, Dr. Walter Binaghi, gained the United
States' assurance that it would return to the negotiating ta-
ble. Certain factions within the United States, primarily the
CAB and the Department of Labor, opposed the $75,000 ceil-
ing because it did not appear to be "interim" to any higher
monetary ceiling.96 The desired $100,000 ceiling appeared to
" 50 DEP'T ST. BULL. 923, 924 (1965). The United States' conditions were stated:
[I]f prior to its effective date of May 15, 1966, there is a reasonable pros-
pect of an international agreement on limits of liability in international
air transportation in the area of $100,000 per passenger or on uniform
rules but without any limit of liability, and if, pending the effectiveness
of such international agreement, there is a provisional arrangement
among the principal international airlines waiving the limits of liability
up to $75,000 per passenger.
Id
"' Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 563-75.
Letter from Dr. Walter Binaghi, President of the ICAO Council, to Nelson B.
David, the United States Representative to the ICAO Council (February 25, 1966),
cited in Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 587 n.296.
' See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 552, 586-88.
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be unattainable in the foreseeable future. 97 However, with
the potential for final accord appearing imminent, the fac-
tions which advocated Dr. Binaghi's proposal realized that
the unsuccessful Montreal Conference left little hope of ever
attaining a $100,000 limit.98 At this juncture, the issue of ab-
solute liability re-emerged which consequently averted a
stalemate among the various factions in the United States
government. With the imposition of absolute liability, theo-
retically litigation would be reduced, settlements would be
reached more expeditiously and the value of plaintiffs' recov-
eries would be substantially greater than under the existing
Warsaw System.99 More importantly, the inclusion of an ab-
solute liability provision would make the $75,000 limitation
more palatable, a quid pro quo for retreat from the strenuous
advocation of the $100,000 limitation of liability.00
The revised proposal included a $75,000 limitation of lia-
bility and the airlines' consent to waive "all necessary [de-
fense] measures" available under article 20(1) of the Warsaw
Convention.'' On May 13, 1966, the proposal was agreed to
and adopted as -the Montreal Agreement.' However, the
compromise solution did not satisfy the United States govern-
ment, which adopted the $75,000 limitation 0 3 with the un-
derstanding that it was merely an interim solution toward
establishing a framework for further negotiation of a higher
limitation. 1O4
Accordingly, the United States expressed concern over the
97 Id.
- It was further argued that the ninefold increase from the original $8,300 limita-
tion represented a substantial accomplishment. Moreover, the United States' accept-
ance of this proposal would be looked upon favorably by the ICAO as well as the
international aviation community in general. Id.
Id. at 587
I Id.
o, Article 20(1) of the Warsaw Convention states, "The carrier shall not be liable if
he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the dam-
age or that it was impossible for him or them to take such measures." Warsaw Con-
vention, supra note 7, art. 20(1).
,.2 54 DEP'T ST. BULL. 955-57 (1966).
o CAB Press Release 66-61, May 13, 1966. The formal CAB Order appears at 31
Fed. Reg. 7,302 (1966).
- Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 552, 586-88.
1983]
94 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
attempt to limit recovery for passengers in international
transportation. While the Convention's liability limitation
originally purported to provide support for a fledgling indus-
try, there was no longer any justification for singling out the
airline industry for special protection against tort liability.
The rapid growth of the aviation industry substantially less-
ened the need for uniformity which the Warsaw Convention
provided, unless courts could pragmatically apply the Con-
vention in individual cases.'05
B. Concluding Remarks.
Any form of proposed legislation concerning the Warsaw
Convention would have encountered the United States' long-
standing distrust of artificial limits imposed upon the right to
recover damages for death or personal injury. The United
States Delegation's conduct at the Hague in 1955 evidenced
this reluctance on the part of the United States. The ten year
epilogue which ensued became a chasm for the legislature to
fill with a viable remedy. However, no such remedy
emerged.
What developed instead were the contemporaneous evolu-
tions of the CAB's undefined passenger ticket specifications
and the judicial expansion of article 3 of the Warsaw Con-
vention. These developments evidenced the fact that the ju-
diciary was re-drafting the treaty. Without an appropriate
response from the legislature, the courts have continued to
search for innovative methods of circumventing the liability
limitations, particularly as seen in the Mertens- Warren -Lisi
trilogy of cases. Not only did the developments through the
late 1950's and the 1960's open the door to further "judicial
legislation" affecting the treaty but, more gravely, they for-
ever clouded the real historical development of the United
States' dissatisfaction with the Warsaw Convention. The sig-
nificance of the trilogy and the CAB's ill-defined proposal for
passenger ticket specifications merely diverted attention away
,or, Se International Air Transport in the Eighties, THE NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE OF
TRANSPORT AND THE NETHERLANDS CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY (Wassenbergh
and van Fenema, ed. 1981).
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from the real concern in the United States over the article 22
limitation of air carrier liability.
PART III
THE TICKET ISSUE TODAY: THE EXTENSION OF
MERTENS, WARREAV and LsI
A. Judicial Interpretation.
If the Montreal Agreement merely supplemented the
treaty provisions of the Warsaw Convention, then by logical
extension, a violation of the Agreement should not give rise to
treaty sanctions against the carrier. Treaty sanctions should
be imposed only when the treaty itself has been violated.
This would become the reformation of the LISi issue as af-
fected by air carriers' adherence to the Montreal Agreement.
On March 14, 1980, an Ilyshin-62 aircraft enroute from
John F. Kennedy International Airport operated by Polski
Linie Lotnicze ("LOT") crashed on approach to Warsaw, Po-
land. 116  As a result, several wrongful death suits were
brought against LOT on behalf of members of the United
States Amateur Athletic Union Boxing Team. These suits
were consolidated before Judge Charles P. Sifton for pre-trial
proceedings in the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of New York.1 °7 Judge Sifton held that the use of
an 8.5 point rather that a 10 point print size in advising inter-
national passengers of the applicable liability limitations con-
stituted a breach of the Montreal Agreement and therefore
did not limit the carrier's liability to $75,000 per passenger.'08
None of the parties disputed the fact that the flight consti-
tuted "international transportation" within the meaning of
article 1(2) of the Warsaw Convention."0 9 Consequently, the
" In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 535 F. Supp. 833
(E.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.), cert. dented sub nom. Polskie Linie Lotnicze
(LOT Polish Airlines) v. Robles, 104 S. Ct. 147 (1983).
-' The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred all actions arising out
of the subject air crash disaster to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (JPMDL October 14, 1980) (MDL
441 unpublished opinion).
- 535 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
,ol Articles 1(1), and (2) of the Warsaw Convention state:
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parties did not dispute that the provisions of the Warsaw
Convention controlled these actions."0 Moreover, LOT ac-
tually entered into the 1966 Intercarrier Agreement known as
the Montreal Agreement."1 '
During the course of discovery proceedings, certain of the
plaintiffs filed motions for partial summary judgment urging
the dismissal of LOT's limitation of liability defense, based
upon the provisions of the Montreal Agreement." 2 In their
motion, the plaintiffs argued that LOT was not entitled to
any limitation of liability because the LOT passenger tickets
did not conform to the requirements of the Montreal Agree-
ment. The plaintiffs contended that the print type must be 10
point modern type size rather than 8.5 point type." 3
Furthermore, the plaintiffs argued that while the Montreal
(1) This convention shall apply to all international transportation of
persons, baggage, or goods performed by aircraft for hire. It shall apply
equally to gratuitous transportation by aircraft performed by an air
transportation enterprise.
(2) For the purposes of this convention the expression "international
transportation" shall mean any transportation in which, according to
the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of
destination, whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a
transshipment, are situated either within the territories of two High
Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting
Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to
the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another power, even
though that power is not a party to this convention. Transportation
without such an agreed stopping place between territories subject to the
sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, or authority of the same High Con-
tracting Party shall not be deemed to be international for the purposes of
this convention.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 1(1), (2).
The courts in recent years have had a number of occasions to consider the back-
ground, history and overall effect of the combined provisions of the Warsaw Conven-
tion and the Montreal Agreement on the rights of the parties to litigation arising out of
"international transportation." See, e.g., Stratis v. Eastern Air Lines, 682 F.2d 406 (2d
Cir. 1982); Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979); Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 922 (1977); Day v. Trans World Airlines, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 890 (1976); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973);
Molitch v. Irish Int'l Airlines, 436 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1970).
,,0 The Peoples' Republic of Poland and the United States are both High Con-
tracting Parties to the Warsaw Convention. 535 F. Supp. at 833, 835.
I d.
" Id. at 834.
Id. at 835.
WARSAW CONVENTION
Agreement's liability limitation should not apply to their
claims, LOT nevertheless should remain bound by waiver of
its defense under article 20(1) of the Warsaw Convention.' 1 4
Thus, the plaintiffs contended that the failure of LOT to
comply with one provision of the Montreal Agreement, the
type size in which the Montreal Advice' 1 5 was printed, should
result only in the unenforceability of the liability limitation
provision of the Montreal Agreement, leaving all other provi-
sions of the Agreement in effect, including LOT's waiver of
the Warsaw Convention's article 20(1) "all necessary meas-
ures" defense.' 16 LOT argued that the noncomformity to the
10 point modern type size was a technical deviation from the
Montreal Agreement that did not warrant waiver of its arti-
cle 20(1) defense.1 '7 Moreover, LOT argued under the guise
of contract principles that its failure to deliver passenger
tickets bearing 10 point modern type was excused by the doc-
trine of substantial performance of LOT's special contract
(Montreal Agreement) with the passengers.' 8
After briefs were filed and oral argument was heard, the
district court granted plaintiffs' motions for partial summary
judgment and dismissed LOT's affirmative defense of the
limitation of liability.1 19 The district court precluded LOT
from limiting its liability because the Montreal Advice was
printed in 8.5 point type rather than the specified 10 point
modern type size.' 2 0 Judge Sifton premised his ruling on the
rationale that the Montreal Agreement was clearly intended
to operate within the framework of the Warsaw Convention
, Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 20(1). Article 20(1) provides, "The carrier
shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary measures
to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such measures."
Id See Grey v. American Airlines, 227 F.2d 282, 285 (2d Cir. 1955) (discussing how
article 20(1) is implemented), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956).
See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
535 F. Supp. at 835.
" Id. at 836.
- Id. at 837-38.
". Id. at 838-39.
'- Id. at 836. Judge Sifton characterized the use of 8.5 type size as a breach of the
passenger contract. However, the print size specification is not part of the passenger's
contract with the carrier because it is not included in the carrier's tariff. LOT Coun-
terpart to Agreement CAB 18900 (New York, January, 1973).
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and, therefore, incorporated all of the relevant provisions of
the Convention.11  Thus, LOT's breach of the provisions of
the Montreal Agreement "ha[d] the same effect as non-deliv-
ery of a conforming ticket as set forth in Article 3(2) of the
Convention.' 1 22 Based on the proposition that the effect of a
Montreal violation constituted a Warsaw violation, Judge
Sifton justified the dismissal of LOT's two pronged argument
without difficulty. 123
With respect to LOT's argument that 8.5 type was a
"purely technical" deviation from the Montreal Agreement
specification, Judge Sifton acknowledged that there were sev-
eral cases which held that ticket notices printed in 8 point
type or less satisfied the requirements of article 3 of the War-
saw Convention, even as interpreted in List'. 24 These cases
did not, however, contemplate adherence to the language of
the Montreal Agreement but instead were scrutinized under
the ticketing requirements of article 3 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion. 125 The LOT case, according to Judge Sifton, was distin-
guishable because the air carriers' agreements to adhere to
the terms of the Montreal Agreement constituted a trade-off
for the United States' decision not to withdraw from the
Warsaw Convention in 1966.126
Having established the thread that connects the Montreal
Agreement to the Warsaw Convention, Judge Sifton then dis-
missed the second prong of LOT's argument, which sought
relief under the contractual principle of substantial perform-
ance. 1 7 While this doctrine is applied to contracts of trans-
portation, the district court reasoned that the contract under
analysis was the Montreal Agreement, not the contract for
carriage itself.' 28 The court rationalized this distinction,
1' 535 F. Supp. at 839.
,22 Id.
12:, The court stated, "The Montreal Agreement was clearly intended . . . to incor-
porate all the relevant provisions of the (Warsaw] Convention." 535 F. Supp. at 839.
I2 d. at 837. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
,- Id. at 837.
,", Id.




The importance of the distinction becomes meaningful in the
context of Corbin's analysis of the substantial performance
doctrine in terms of the purposes of the particular contract
said to have been substantially performed . . . . Here, the
character of the performance promised, notice in a specified
type size, itself suggests that strict compliance was intended
by the parties to the Montreal Agreement. 129
Because the purpose of the Montreal Agreement, like that of
the Warsaw Convention, was to regulate by uniform terms
the conditions under which the United States would continue
to adhere to the treaty, the court cast doubt on whether a
doctrine such as substantial performance had a valid role to
play in light of the Montreal Agreement's "quasi-legislative
purpose."130
The district court concluded that the 8.5 point type devia-
tion from the Montreal Agreement specification precluded
any limitation of liability. 13 ' The court further accepted the
plaintiffs' argument which bound LOT by its waiver of the
"all necessary measures" defense against any liability pro-
vided by article 20(1) of the Warsaw convention. 132 Accord-
ing to the court, the Montreal Agreement provides an
intricate and inevitable nexus to the provisions of the treaty.
On appeal, LOT expanded its argument and diverged
from the contractual principles it had relied upon in the dis-
trict court. 3 3 LOT argued that the thrust of the 10 point
modern type size specification under the Montreal Agree-
ment was to assure that passengers in international transpor-
tation are given adequate notice of the applicability of the
carrier's limited liability.134 LOT further argued that the leg-
islative history of the Montreal Agreement did not attach any
129 Id.
'"Id.
Id. at 835, 839.
112 Id.
'1 In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 705 F.2d 85 (2d
Cir.), cert denied sub noa. Polskie Linie Lotnicze (LOT Polish Airlines) v. Robles, 104 S.
Ct. 147 (1983).
,.1 Id. at 88-89.
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particular significance to 10 point modern type size.' 35 LOT
also contended that its passenger tickets complied with the
intent and purpose of the Warsaw Convention and the Mon-
treal Agreement in that the 8.5 point type provided adequate
notice to passengers. 136 Moreover, LOT argued that a partic-
ular print size specification was not a part of the passengers'
contract with the airline because it is not included in LOT's
tariffs filed with the CAB, and therefore, LOT had not com-
mitted any tariff violations which would justify invocation of
the treaty sanction of absolute and unlimited liability.
137
Furthermore, LOT contended that it had not violated the
Warsaw Convention and thus the treaty sanction of absolute
and unlimited liability could not be imposed. 138 LOT rea-
soned that if it could not avail itself of the limitation of liabil-
ity defense, then the Montreal Agreement should be rendered
inapplicable in its entirety to the litigation.139
The Plaintiffs-Appellees' argument mirrored the points
raised by LOT. The plaintiffs took the position that the duty
of strict compliance with the terms and conditions of the
Montreal Agreement was breached by LOT, thereby depriv-
ing the carrier of all treaty defenses. 140 LOT's breach of the
10 point modern type size specification had the same effect as
non-delivery of a conforming ticket under article 3(2) of the
Warsaw Convention. 141
Oral argument was heard by the Second Circuit on Janu-
ary 18, 1983. The strength of LOT's argument on appeal
seemingly rested on one central point, namely that stripping
the carrier of its limited liability defense is a treay sanction
only to be invoked by a treay violation. 42 The Montreal
Agreement is neither a statute, a law, nor a treaty. Relying
Id.
Id.
. Id. at 89-90.
I d. at 90.
: Id. at 91.
Brief For Plaintiffs-Appellees Smiegel, Pimental, Bland, Wesson, Chavis, Radison
and Lindsay (No. 82-7616 MDL 441) (2d Cir. 1982) at 5, 8-10.
,4, Id. at 13.
"4 In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 705 F.2d at 90.
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on the legislative history of the Warsaw Convention, the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed Judge Sifton's holding against LOT.14 3
According to the Second Circuit, to argue as LOT had done,
that a violation of the 10 point modern type size specification
of the Montreal Agreement could not invoke a treaty sanc-
tion, ignores the historical and functional relationship of the
Montreal Agreement to the Warsaw Convention.144 The Sec-
ond Circuit stated, "The Agreement supplements the Con-
vention in particular respects, but Article 3(2) still imposes on
carriers the duty to inform passengers of liability limitations.
Failure to do so, as measured either by the terms of Article 3
or the Montreal Agreement, results in fortfeiture of the
limitation."' 14 5
Within the parameters of "adequate notice," the court's
treatment of LOT's argument concerning when a treaty sanc-
tion is warranted overlooked the import of the distinction
LOT attempted to draw. Regardless of whether the use of
8.5 point type by LOT was a mere technical deficiency, the
10 point modern type size specification is not a treaty require-
ment. Unlimited liability is the fate of a carrier who accepts
a passenger without delivering a passenger ticket pursuant to
article 3(2) of the Convention. "Delivery" as interpreted by
the courts in Mertens, Warren and Li'st' 14 6 requires reasonable
notice such that the passenger has an opportunity to take
measures against the carrier's liability limitation. 47  But
LOT did effect such a delivery. 148
Strictly applying the intent of article 3(2)'s "delivery" re-
quirement, 8.5 type cannot be placed in the same category as
the "Lilliputian" 4 point type found inadequate in Lisi. Ar-
guably, but for the specification in the Montreal Agreement
' Id. at 85.
,41 Id. at 90.
14 Id
'Ili See supra notes 63-77 and accompanying text.
147 In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw Poland on March 14, 1980, 705 F.2d at 89.
148 The appellant pointed out that "[t]he difference in size between 10 point modern
type size and 8.5 point type is 15/720ths of one inch calculated upon the basis of there
being 72 type points to one inch." Brief of Defendant-Appellant Polskie Linie Lotnicze
(LOT Polish Airlines) at 7 n.9 (2d Cir. 1982) (No. 82-7616 MDL 441).
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and the tie-in of that specification to article 3(2) "delivery,"
LOT did not violate the treaty requirements under article
3(2). The Second Circuit seems to have had this in mind
when it stated, "Whatever merit LOT's argument might
have were we considering the adequacy of notice solely under
the Warsaw Convention, the fact remains that we are not."'' 49
Because the LOT appeal was decided not only under the
Warsaw Convention but also under the Montreal Agreement,
one would expect the distinction between article 3(2) of the
Convention and the 10 point modern type size specification
contained in the Agreement to emerge more clearly. The
Second Circuit acknowledged that it is a violation of article
3(2), which LOT did not commit, that gives rise to the treaty
sanction.150 The court stated, "The [Montreal] Agreement
supplements the Convention in particular respects, but Article
3(2) still imposes on carriers the duty to inform passengers of liability
limt'iations. ""' Simply stated, the treaty has its own ticketing
requirements, and accordingly, its own sanctions for not ad-
hering to those requirements.
In support of its rationale that either article 3(2) of the
Warsaw Convention or the 10 point modern type size specifi-
cation of the Montreal Agreement may preclude the carrier
from availing itself of the liability limitation, the court em-
phasized how the adequacy of the notice of limitation was a
decisive factor in the United States' ultimate withdrawal of
its notice of denunciation of the Warsaw Convention. With-
drawal of the denunciation, according to the Second Circuit,
indicated a judgment by at least the executive branch that 10
point type was necessary.1 5 2
It is dubious whether the Second Circuit appreciated the
genuine import of the history behind the treaty's develop-
ment. The executive branch was concerned about the ade-
quacy of notice, not a specified print size.' 53 The United
'19 In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 705 F.2d at 89.
- Id. at 90.
- Id. (emphasis added).
,52 Id. at 91.
"I See supra notes 40-53, 92-105 and accompanying text.
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States' primary concern with the interim proposal which be-
came the Montreal Agreement was to increase the Warsaw
Convention's liability limitation and to apprise passengers
adequately of the limitations which potentially applied to
them.'54 It was not, as the Second Circuit seems to indicate,
the actual size of the ticket print which ultimately deter-
mined the United States' position with respect to the treaty,
but rather the increased liability limit and the prospects for
further increases.'55
The ticket requirements which emerged from the Hague
and Montreal Conferences momentarily pacified the United
States because they increased the recovery ceiling substan-
tially and insured that the passenger was adequately notified
of that ceiling. 5 6 The selection of 10 point type, as opposed
to 8 point or 12 point, was arbitrary, as the Second Circuit
admits,'57 and served only as a vehicle to implement the real
intention of the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal
Agreement. The 10 point modern type size specification does
not even have a strong nexus to article 3(2) of the Warsaw
Convention as article 3(2) has its own "adequate notice" re-
quirement, established as a result of Lisi and acknowledged
by the Second Circuit in LOT. As long as that requirement is
met, the Warsaw Convention has not been violated.
If, as the Second Circuit warned, the historical and func-
tional relationship between the Warsaw Convention and the
Montreal Agreement must not be ignored, 58 then fulfillment
of both article 3(2)'s requirements and the Montreal Agree-
ment's intention to offer "adequate notice" was achieved by
LOT. LOT's use of 8.5 point type did provide adequate no-
tice of the liability limitation to passengers. Article 3(2)'s no-
tice requirement certainly was not meant to be interpreted by
such a narrow, technical standard.
59
The historical relationship between the Warsaw Conven-
,- Id.
- Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 586-96.
- See supra text at note 153; supra notes 40-53, 92-105 and accompanying text.
-' Id.
- Id.
1r, See supra note 148.
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tion and its progeny nevertheless led the court in LOT to
equate specification of type size with the article 3(2) require-
ment for delivery. 160 Failure to inform passengers of liability
limitations, whether measured by article 3(2) or the Montreal
Agreement, results in forfeiture of the limitation. 1 ' Thus, in
the eyes of the Second Circuit the effect of a violation of the
Montreal Agreement is no different from a violation of the
Warsaw Convention. Despite the significance of the fact that
an international treaty is the supreme law of the land while
the Montreal Agreement "is not clothed in such a sovereign
robe," 62 the judiciary utilized the provisions of the Montreal
Agreement to circumvent the liability limitation provisions of
the Warsaw Convention.1
63
The Second Circuit left open the issue of adequate delivery
as it affected passengers who traveled with tickets in appro-
priate form prior to boarding LOT. 64 If those passengers
had already received adequate notice of the carrier's liability
limitation on the domestic leg of their international journey
(before making the New York to Warsaw connection), the
8.5 point print size may strip the carrier of the liability limi-
tation. If it does, then the real purpose of the Warsaw Con-
vention and the Montreal Agreement is thwarted because the
passenger has had the opportunity to counteract the limita-
tion by purchasing insurance, regardless of print size issues.
One year before the LOT appeal was presented to the
court, the Second Circuit addressed this issue in Stratis v. East-
ern Air Lines. 165 While the issue in Stratis was delivery under
article 3 of the Warsaw Convention and did not involve the
Montreal Agreement, the case illustrates how the Second Cir-
cuit departed from the very history of the Warsaw/Montreal
relationship which it had charged LOT with having ig-
-0 In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 705 F.2d at 90.
161 Id.
12 Windbourne v. Eastern Airlines, 479 F. Supp. 1130, 1169 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
wi LOT's petition for a writ of certiorari was denied on October 3, 1983. Polskie
Linie Lotnicze (LOT Polish Airlines) v. Robles, 104 S. Ct. 147 (1983).
- In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 705 F.2d at 86
n.2.
16, 682 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1982).
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nored.'66 On June 23, 1975, Stratis, a Greek seaman, was dis-
charged from his ship, the S.S. Paros, at Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, due to an illness. Under Greek law and the
United States immigration laws,1 67 he was required to be re-
patriated at the expense of the vessel's owner. Accordingly,
the vessel owner's agents arranged for Stratis and three other
Greek seamen to travel on Delta Air Lines Flight 412 from
Baton Rouge to New Orleans and on Eastern Air Lines
Flight 66 from New Orleans to New York. 68  The four
seamen were then to connect from New York to Athens on
Olympic Airways Flight 418, all to take place on June
24th. 16
9
Stratis received a ticket in Baton Rouge covering only the
domestic portion of his travel with Delta and Eastern. 7 '
Olympic's New York City office prepared a prepaid ticket ad-
vice containing notice of the Warsaw Convention's applica-
bility for the international segment of this trip on Olympic.'
71
Olympic then transmitted the information on the ticket no-
tice by telephone to the American Airlines desk at John F.
Kennedy International Airport, where American maintained
the Olympic counter pursuant to a ground handling agree-
ment with Olympic. 7 2 At Kennedy, a ticket was issued for
Stratis' international travel but it did not bear the date of its
issuance or a validation stamp nor was it ever "delivered" toStratis. 171
On approach to Kennedy Airport from New Orleans, East-
ern Flight 66 crashed, killing 113 of the 124 persons on board.
Stratis survived and sued Eastern Air Lines and the United
- In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 705 F.2d at 90.
167 The relevant provisions of the U.S. Immigration Law require that, in such cases,
the individual must make "definite arrangements" to depart from the U.S. before he is
permitted entry into the country from his ship. 8 U.S.C. § 1282(a); 8 C.F.R.
§ 252.1 (c), (d).
- Stratis v. Eastern Air Lines, 682 F.2d at 409.
6,9 Id.
70 Georgakis v. Eastern Air Lines, 512 F. Supp. 330, 331 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).




106 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
States74 to recover damages for his injuries. On the eve of
trial, the United States consented to the entry of a liability
judgment against it in all of the cases consolidated on the
issue of liability in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York. 175 Eastern Air Lines proceeded
to trial and was found negligent by the jury. 176
In the lower court, Stratis moved for partial summary
judgment to strike Eastern's affirmative defense of limitation
of liability under the Warsaw Convention. The district court
granted the motion, stating that the fundamental inquiry
under the provisions of the Warsaw Convention is whether
the passenger is involved in "international travel"' 177 as evi-
denced by the passenger's ticket. 7  Because the only ticket
held by Stratis at the time of the crash authorized purely do-
,14 The claim against the United States was for negligent air traffic control operation
of Kennedy Airport by the Federal Aviation Administration. 682 F.2d at 408 n.I.
' Id at 408.
, In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport on June 24, 1975, 635
F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1980).
" 512 F. Supp. at 331 n.5. The Convention defines "international transportation"
as:
any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the par-
ties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not
there be a break in the transportation or the transshipment, are situated
either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within
the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed
stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty,
mandate or authority of another power, even though that power is not a
party to this convention. Transportation without such an agreed stop-
ping place between territories subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty,
mandate, or authority of the same High Contracting Party shall not be
deemed to be international for the purposes of this convention.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 1(2). Such transportation however need not
take place on only one airline under article 1(3):
[T]ransportation to be performed by several successive air carriers shall
be deemed, for the purposes of this convention, to be one undivided
transportation, if it has been regarded by the parties as a single opera-
tion, whether it has been agreed upon under the form of a single con-
tract or a series of contracts and it shall not lose its international
character merely because one contract or a series of contracts is to be
performed entirely within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suze-
rainty, mandate or authority of the same High Contracting Party.
Id art. 1(3).
" Stratis v. Eastern Air Lines, 75 Civ. 1151 (HB), cited in the companion case of
Georgakis v. Eastern Air Lines, 512 F. Supp. 330, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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mestic transportation, the district court concluded that
Stratis was not, in fact, proceeding in "international travel"
when Eastern Flight 66 crashed. 7 9 Furthermore, a ticket for
his international travel had not been delivered to him pursu-
ant to article 3 of the Convention.
°80
On appeal to the Second Circuit, Eastern Air Lines suc-
ceeded in invoking its Warsaw Convention limitation of lia-
bility defense, thereby obtaining a reversal of the district
court decision.' Acknowledging that "the rub in the case is,
of course, that the only ticket delivered to Stratis was the tick-
et covering the domestic flights,"18 2 the Second Circuit never-
theless agreed with Eastern's counter-argument that a
passenger ticket containing the required notice had been de-
livered to Stratis and that the overall contract was one for
"international transportation" within the meaning of article
1(3) of the Warsaw Convention." 3 While Eastern satisfied
the court that Stratis did actually have a contract for interna-
tional travel," 4 the real inquiry turned on whether the ab-
sence of delivery of the ticket for his international segment
was an irregularity affecting the validity of the overall con-
tract of transportation.1 8 5 The Second Circuit characterized
the inquiry as follows:
-7 The district court, in Georgakis v. Eastern Air Lines, 512 F. Supp. 330 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), held Eastern Air Lines collaterally estopped from relitigating against another
seaman the Warsaw Convention issue which already had been decided in Stratis. 512
F. Supp. at 334.
o Eastern attempted to argue in the district court that the Warsaw limitation of
liability provision was included in Stratis' ticket for domestic travel on the Delta and
Eastern flights, and that this inclusion was sufficient to meet the notice requirement of
Meriens v. Flying Tiger Line, 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965), discussed supra, note 63 and
accompanying text. The court rejected Eastern's contention, noting that there was
serious doubt "whether Mr. Stratis or anyone else for that matter, can be said to truly
understand what this notice provision states." The court added, "While the airlines'
notice provision may certainly appear to be Greek to even the well-seasoned traveler, it
certainly was not Greek to Mr. Stratis, a Greek seaman, whose deposition was con-
ducted through a Greek interpreter." Transcript of District Court Proceedings, 75 Civ.
1151 (HB) (August 3, 1979) as cited in Georgakis v. Eastern Air Lines, 512 F. Supp.
330, 333 n. Il (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
'-' Stratis v. Eastern Air Lines, 682 F.2d at 413.
"2 Id. at 409.
Id. at 412.
Id at 410 n.4.
Id. at 412.
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Absent delivery of a ticket for the international leg of the
journey, the question is not whether Stratis knew his domestic
flight could be subject to the Convention as a leg of an in-
ternational flight under Article 1(3) . . .but whether he had
reason to know his overall flight was international. If not, he
lacked a reasonable opportunity to buy insurance or take
other precautions against the limitation of liability; if so, the
treaty requires his domestic flight to be subject to the
limitation. 186
At the threshold, the Second Circuit sorted out the precedent
on both sides and concluded that "[t]he relevant case law
does not answer the argument."187
The thrust of the court's inquiry was properly concerned
with the underlying intention of the treaty writers.'88 The
Second Circuit, however, did not arrive at a conclusion con-
sistent with its own analysis. Concluding that it did not know
what the treaty writers intended, the court reasoned that to
answer the inquiry in favor of either Eastern or Stratis would
be equally arbitrary. Ultimately, according to the court, a
passenger such as Stratis must be presumed to know that his
flight is international in nature and that the Convention limi-
tations apply. 1
89
The majority properly recognized that the intent of article
3 was to provide the passenger with notice of the limitation of
liability, so as to afford him the opportunity to take any
measures necessary in the face of the carrier's liability limita-
tion. But, there was nothing on the facts in Stratis to suggest
that Stratis was ever given that opportunity. The majority
seems to have concluded by implication that where the ticket
delivery requirement of the Convention applies to the domes-
tic leg of a journey, and where notice is printed in a language
that is foreign to a passenger, non-delivery of the ticket to
such passenger for travel to the foreign destination is excused.
The majority's pursuit of the unwritten intention behind
Sid.
, Id. at 410.
'I" Id. at 412.
' Id. at 413-14.
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article 3 resulted in limiting Eastern's liability. The court iso-
lated for analytical purposes the United States' historical dis-
satisfaction over the liability limitation. But the court
progressed from this sound analysis to an inapposite conclu-
sion, which demonstrates the judicial outcry for new legisla-
tion affecting the Warsaw Convention. The dissent
illuminates how the majority's argument went awry.
From the standpoint of Eastern's involvement in the trans-
portation of Stratis, the majority's holding puts the cart
before the horse and permits Eastern a limitation of liability
strictly because it was ignorant of Stratis' further travel on an
international segment. Eastern had no idea that Stratis was
on the domestic leg of an international journey because a
ticket for transportation to his destination in Athens never
had been delivered to Stratis. In the absence of such knowl-
edge, Eastern had no occasion to adjust its liability insurance
in light of the Convention's limitation. As Judge Newman
points out in his dissent, the failure to comply with the practi-
cal intent of the Warsaw Convention results in a reward for
the carrier:
I fully agree with the majority that, under our prior decisions,
the possible unfairness of the Convention is no reason to con-
strue it narrowly. But surely its unfairness is not a reason to
construe it broadly. If there ever was a case where an entity
seeking a windfall from the terms of a provision should be
held to a literal application of those terms, it is a common
carrier seeking refuge in a limitation of liability."9
The suggestion by the dissent that Eastern sought this ref-
uge for the purpose of unjust enrichment is an unfair over-
statement that digresses from the issue in the case.
Nevertheless, Judge Newman addressed the central inquiry
which the majority posed without answering. The dissent
reasoned:
The majority asks "If the 'absence' of a ticket does not affect
the existence of the contract [pursuant to article 3(2)] but the
carrier 'must deliver' a ticket [pursuant to article 3(1)], what
- Id. at 419 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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did the treaty writers intend?" ...... I think the answer is
obvious. They intended, just as they said, that a ticket must
be delivered to the passenger. . . . By removing the limita-
tion of liability for a carrier who accepts a passenger to whom
a ticket has not been delivered, the Article [3 of the Conven-
tion] plainly implies that the "absence" of a ticket mentioned
in the first sentence [of article 3(2)] pertains to a passenger to
whom a ticket has previously been delivered.' 9 '
Any "absence, loss, or irregularity" of the passenger ticket
under article 3(2) contemplates that a ticket was delivered in
the first place. To hold as the majority had done, both in
Stratis and in LOT would be to interpret the "absence" of the
ticket under article 3(2) as synonymous with non-delivery.
The effect of doing so is to impose treaty sanctions where the
actual terms of the Warsaw Convention do not so provide.
This, the dissent properly concludes, contravenes a consistent
interpretation of the treaty as a whole. 192
B. Concluding Remarks.
What has emerged from the Second Circuit's rulings in
LOT and Straizs is a judicial failure to differentiate the impli-
cations of violating the inter-carrier (Montreal) Agreement
from the implications of violating article 3 of the Warsaw
Convention. Only the latter embraces the concept of limit-
less liability borne by the carrier's failure to "deliver" a pas-
senger ticket. If the treaty drafters had intended to create
gradations of ticket "delivery," the history behind article 3 of
the Warsaw Convention would indicate this. It does not.
193
In any event, it is doubtful that the treaty drafters intended
or anticipated that the unequivocal term "delivery" as used
in article 3 of the Warsaw Convention would be dissected by
the judiciary and given ever-changing dimensions according
to judicial desires to circumvent the liability limitation.
Underlying the entanglement of ticketing issues is the need
... Id. at 418-19 (Newman, J., dissenting).
,m' Id.
, II Conference International de Droit Prive Aerien, 4-12 Oct. 1929, 1929 Varsovie
17, at 18-22, 150, 258-59 [hereinafter Warsaw Minutes].
WARSAW CONVENTION
to determine the nature and extent of the interface between a
treaty and a contract. The common denominator to both the
Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Agreement is the con-
cept of limited liability, but just how it is to be administered
seems to defy principles of judicial logic. Arguably, the sim-
ple reason for this is that there is no longer any justification
for limiting a carrier's liability to United States passengers,
and the judiciary remains bound by a recognized principle of
international law, "pacta sunt servando," meaning that
treaty obligations must be observed.194
This entanglement was demonstrated in LOT, when the
Second Circuit equated the use of 8.5 point type under the
Montreal Agreement with non-delivery under article 3(1) of
the Warsaw Convention. 195 The Second Circuit further ex-
hibited the problem in Stratis by equating the "absence, irreg-
ularity, or loss" of the ticket under article 3(2) with non-
delivery under article 3(1). Both conclusions run afoul of the
import of the treaty and the Montreal Agreement.
Literally, Stratis' ticket was issued and validated, so the
mechanics of article 3 of the treaty technically were met.
Pragmatically, however, Stratis never received the ticket for
his international segment and thereby never had an opportu-
nity to read the ticket advice in Greek and act upon it ac-
cordingly. Similarly, in LOT, 8.5 point type is not 10 point
modern type size, and the technical specification had not
been met. In reality, the ticket advice was given; the contract
for transportation was intact; and the Warsaw Convention
was not violated.
The United States' portrayal as the "hold out" throughout
the historical struggle to attain international accord on the
liability limitation is the most definitive pronouncement of
why article 22 of the Warsaw Convention is no longer vital.
If the judiciary were to treat the history accordingly, inflexi-
ble analyses would yield to purposeful interpretation of the
treaty provisions. Because it is not for the courts to re-write
,- Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 270 (1890); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.)
635, 637 (1853).
1- See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
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or abrogate the Warsaw Convention, the propriety of the lia-
bility limitation is equally beyond the purview of the judicial
system. The courts do have the power to utilize the historical
looking glass which has been welded by the recurrent reserva-
tions expressed by the United States over article 22. Through
the looking glass, one of two conclusions will emerge; either
(i) international transportation by air no longer deserves the
unique status of having a ceiling for the amount of recover-
able damages; or (ii) if this status is still warranted and the
judiciary must work within the legislative parameters, then
the Warsaw Convention and its progeny must be interpreted,
not in terms of "broadness" or "narrowness" as the Second
Circuit attempted, but merely with a flexibility which em-
braces the pragmatic resolution of issues. This second, prag-
matic approach would have dictated opposite conclusions to
those reached by the Second Circuit in LOT and Stratis.
As matters stand in the 1980's, with the most recent at-
tempt at legislation having failed, it seems that the latter of
the two choices is at least the short term answer to halting ad
hoc judicial amendments to the text of the Warsaw Conven-
tion. However, the judicial progression is moving now from a
sequence of carved exceptions to broad, sweeping decisions




A. The Emergence of the Gold Standard.
When the Warsaw Convention originally established the
$8,300 liability limitation, it was specified in terms of Poin-
care francs of a certain gold content.1 96 Gold was chosen as
the unit of conversion because it served official monetary
-; The Warsaw Convention internationally established the rule that carriers are lia-
ble for damage sustained by a passenger in the course of international transportation
up to an amount not exceeding 125,000 Poincare francs. Article 22(4) of the Warsaw
Convention defines the franc as a gold coin consisting of 65.5 milligrams of gold. War-
saw Convention, supra note 7, art. 22(4). See Warsaw Proceedings, supra note 4, at 221-
25. This dollar equivalent has been in effect in the United States since 1933.
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functions internationally and its price was set by law in most
countries, including the United States.' 97 For the first twenty
years the gold standard provided the desired uniformity;
however, changes in the value of currency were inevitable. 98
The rates of currency exchange began to fluctuate rapidly
and the liability limits began to appear hopelessly inade-
quate.'99 Moreover, there were considerable differences de-
veloping in the level of damages among the various signatory
nations to the Warsaw Convention.2 00 Because gold was as-
suming a more flexible, less stable role in the world economy,
it became less significant as a benchmark for the performance
of international monetary functions, and as such, no longer
could serve adequately as the standard of conversion for de-
termining article 22's liability limitation.20
In 1934, the value of gold was set at $35.00 per troy ounce
pursuant to the United States Gold Reserve Act of 1934.2
When the United States became a party to the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1945 under the Bretton Woods
Agreement Act,20 3 it became obligated as a signatory to
maintain the value of the United States dollar in terms of
gold.20 4 When the Bretton Woods Agreement was signed by
the United States, the U.S. dollar was more valuable than
gold. Hence, the United States' commitment to redeem all
dollars in gold could be made without actually having to ful-
fill the promise .2' Beginning in 1955, however, the United
States faced a balance of payments deficit, giving rise to a
dollar glut.20 6 In order to compensate for this, central banks
abroad began trading their dollars for gold and speculators
- In re Air Crash at Kimpo Int'l Airport, Korea on November 18, 1980, 558 F.
Supp. 72, 73 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
1 C. SHAWCROSS & M. BEAUMONT, AIR LAW, supra note 4, $ 332.
I d.
SId.
a,, Id. 1 335, 453.
2,2 Pub. L. No. 73-87, 48 Stat. 337 (1934).
'z,:1 Bretton Woods Agreement Act, ch. 339, § 2, PUB. L. No. 79-171, 59 STAT. 512
(1945) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 286 (1976)).
" Id. § 7.
" P. SAMUELSON, EcONOMIcs 678-88 (8th Ed. 1970).
Id. at 690-91.
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began hoarding it. The U.S. gold reserves thus plummeted
and the gold standard's demise was imminent. 20 7
Confronted with the depletion of gold reserves in the
United States, the central banks of Belgium, the Federal Re-
public of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom and the United States agreed to stop sup-
plying gold to private markets. This gave rise to the creation
of a "two-tier" system for the implementation of gold pricing:
a market price which was set and the official price which had
been derived under Bretton Woods.20 8 However, a stronger
measure was needed to turn the depletion around, so in 1971
the United States suspended its commitment under Bretton
Woods to convert dollars into gold.20 9
A two year proposal was developed in 1976 by the IMF to
devalue the official price of gold. 210 The plan, known as the
Jamaica Accords, was adopted in April, 1978. The IMF sub-
stituted special drawing rights (SDR's), as the reserve asset
and unit of account, based upon sixteen major world curren-
cies. 211 Accordingly, most references to gold in the IMF's
Articles of Agreement were deleted and the official function
of gold was replaced with the SDR's. 21 2 The new unit of con-
version, SDR, was to be calculated in accordance with the
,7 Id. at 691.
2- Asser, Golden Limitations of Liability in International Transport Conventions and the Cur-
rency Crisi , 5 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 645, 650 (1974); Gold, Gold in International Monetary
Law. Change, Uncertainty andAmbiguity, 15 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 323, 340-41 (1981); Note,
Legal Problems in Compensation Under the Gold Clauses of Private International Law Agreements,
63 GEO. L. J. 817 (1975).
" P. SAMUELSON, supra note 205, at 641.
2... In replacing the official function of gold, however, Congress specified that it
would be utilized for the limited purpose of determining the value of gold held in the
form of gold certificates. 31 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1976); S. REP. No. 1295, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 18 (1976).
2 1 C. SHAWCROSS & M. BEAUMONT, supra note 4, 335. In January, 1981, the
basket of national currencies was reduced to five. See Ward, The SDR in Transport Lia-
bility Conventions. Some Clariftations, 13 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 3 (1981).
212 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (Second Amend-
ment), approved April 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937.
Gold was demonetized in the United States by repeal of the Par Value Modification
Act, Pub. L. No. 92-268, 86 Stat. 116 (1972), amended by Par Value Modification Act
(formerly codified at 31 U.S.C. § 449 (1976)), repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-564 (1976).
What the Par Value Modification Act had done was to devalue the dollar by raising
the official price of gold, first to $38.00 per ounce in 1972 (Pub. L. No. 92-268, § 2, 86
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method of valuation applied by the IMF.21 3 However, if a
high contracting party was not a member of the IMF, the
value of a national currency in terms of the SDR would be
calculated in a manner determined by that party. 14
B. Judicial Interpretation.
These radical alterations in the international' monetary sys-
tem threw the Warsaw Convention limitations into a caul-
dron of historic and economic problems. Gold's new identity
as a free market priced commodity undermined the Conven-
tion's unit of conversion in its entirety. Anticipating the dis-
cord which the gold crisis would create, the Warsaw
Conferees met in 1975, before the IMF plan was proposed,
and substituted SDR's as the Warsaw Convention's unit of
conversion. 2 5 At the time of the proposal, the SDR was cal-
culated in terms of gold.2 16 The difficulty is that some coun-
tries have adopted the SDR for purposes of interpreting the
standard of conversion under article 22 of the Warsaw Con-
vention and other countries have not done SO. 2 17 Hence, de-
spite its relative stability, the SDR did not foster the kind of
uniform adoption and application which was necessary. 18
The gold controversy is well presented in decisions from
two district courts sitting respectively in the Fifth and Second
Circuits. They are Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan
Stat. 116 (1972)) and then to $42.22 per ounce in 1973 (Pub. L. No. 93-110, § 1, 87
Stat. 352 (1973)).
21:1 1 C. SHAWCROSS & M. BEAUMONT, supra note 4, 335.
- Id.
2I5 Id.
.. Gold, supra note 208, at 345.
2' Sweden and Britain have adopted SDR's for purposes of the Warsaw Conven-
tion. See Sweden's Carriage by Air Act (Sterling Equivalents) Order of 1980, Statutory
Instrument 1980 No. 281, effective March 21, 1980. Both the Netherlands and Rome
apparently have reached the same results. State of the Netherlands v. Giant Shipping
Corp., Rectspraak van de Week, 30 May 1981, 321 (Supreme Court of the Nether-
lands, May 1, 1981); Linee Aerea Italiane v. Ricciole (Rome Civil Court Judgement
609/1979, Nov. 14, 1978. A court in Greece has opted for the free market price of gold.
Zakoapolos v. Olympic Airways Corp., No. 256 of 1974 Ct. of App.; 3d Dep't., Athens,
Greece (February 15, 1974). India has adopted the same. Kuwait Airways Corp. v.
Sanghi, Regular Appeal No. 54 of 1977 (Civil Station, Bangalore, India, August 11,
1978).
2,6 1 C. SHAWCROSS & M. BEAUMONT, supra note 4, 335-36.
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American World AiWays, 2 19 and Frankh Mit Corp. v. Trans
World Airhhes. 220 The district courts in Texas and New York
had held that the proper standards for conversion of the War-
saw limitation into U.S. dollars were, respectively, the free
market price of gold in Boehringer and the last official price of
gold in the United States in Frankhn Mnt. 221 The Boehringer
decision is presently on appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. A decision probably will not be
handed down by that court until the United States Supreme
Court has had an opportunity to resolve the issues before it in
Frankhn Mint which may well determine the future of the
Warsaw Convention in its entirety.
In March of 1979, Franklin Mint Corporation delivered to
TWA four packages weighing approximately 715 pounds.
The cargo was to be shipped from Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania to London's Heathrow Airport.222 While the pack-
ages were said to contain a large quantity of valuable coins,
Franklin Mint made no special declaration of value on them
at the time they were delivered to TWA.223 The packages
never arrived at their destination in the United Kingdom,
and Franklin Mint brought suit for the alleged loss valued at
$250,000.224
TWA invoked article 22 of the Warsaw Convention which
provides that unless a special value is declared, the carriers'
liability for checked cargo is the equivalent of 250 francs per
kilogram.225 Article 22 also provides that "[this limitation]
shall be deemed to refer to the French franc consisting of 65
1/2 milligrams of gold at the standard of fineness of nine
hundred thousandths [the so-called Poincare franc]. These
V' 531 F. Supp. 344 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
525 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),afd, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1983),cert. granted,
77 L. Ed. 2d 1347 (June 13, 1983).
2, In LOT, the gold standard issue was presented with the ticket issue. The district
court decision aligned itself with Franklin Mint, holding that the proper standard was
the last official price of gold in the United States. In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw,
Poland on March 14, 1980, 535 F. Supp. 833, 839 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
222 Frank/in Mint, 525 F. Supp. at 1288.
22:, Id.
2 I d. at 1289.
221 Id.
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sums may be converted into any national currency in round
figures.
226
TWA presented three possible bases for the method of con-
verting the article 22 limitation into U.S. dollars. First, the
SDR which was being used by some members of the IMF was
raised.227 Second, the last official price of gold in the United
States was proposed as a proper unit of account.22 8 Third,
the exchange value of the current French franc was placed
before the court for its consideration. 229 Franklin Mint pro-
posed to the court that the free market price of gold be con-
sidered as a viable fourth alternative. 230
The district court upheld the liability limitation and com-
puted the monetary award in terms of the last official price of
gold in the United States.23 ' This basis, according to the
court, at least bears the implicit approval of the legislature
since it is the standard of conversion espoused by the CAB,
the government agency most intimately concerned with the
transaction at hand.232 A judgment was entered for Franklin
Mint in the amount of $6,479.98.33
Franklin Mint appealed to the Second Circuit. With the
four alternative conversion standards before it, three pro-
posed by TWA and one by Franklin Mint, the court refused
to adopt any one of them and thereby rendered the Warsaw
Convention's limitations prospectively unenforceable in
United States courts.2 34 The court dismissed each conversion
standard individually while holding fast to an overall senti-
ment that the Convention is outmoded. 235 Designed to pro-
226 Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 22(4). See supra note 10 for the text of
article 22(4).
27 See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
"2, 525 F. Supp. at 1289.
22 Id. See Chamie v. Egyptiar (Cours d'appel Paris, Jan. 31, 1980); Pakistan Int'l
Airlines v. Compagnie Air Inter. S.A. (Cours d'appel Aix-en-Provence, Oct. 31, 1981).




214 Frankh/i Mini, 690 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 1982).
2: I d. at 309-11.
19831
118 JOURNAL OFAIR LAWAND COMMERCE [49
tect "the fledgling aviation industry," '236 the Convention's
establishment of a uniform, stabilized conversion standard in
gold no longer met its objective of insulating recoveries from
the vicissitudes of currency devaluation. 37
Like SDR's, each of the other three conversion standards
proposed had a "devastating argument against it.'"238 With
respect to the last official price of gold, the case for its contin-
ued use found support in neither law nor logic. This stan-
dard already had been explicitly rejected by Congress in 1978
and was out of touch with both economic and monetary real-
ity.239 The Second Circuit further noted that neither the free
market price of gold nor the current French franc was ever
accepted as a conversion standard by the Convention's fram-
ers. 240 The adoption of either would represent a "gross depar-
ture" from the Convention's thrust toward stable, uniform
recoveries. 24' The court stated that use of the free market
price of gold would simply mean adoption of a daily fluctuat-
ing price, affected by the volatile nature of supply and de-
mand. 42 Similarly, adoption of the exchange value of the
French franc would deliberately flout the avowed desire of
the treaty drafters to avoid the use of a single national cur-
rency subject to unilateral action.243
As it did in Straits, 244 the Second Circuit took cognizance of
the central underpinnings of the Warsaw Convention.245
However, the court deferred to "the province of the execu-
- Id. at 306.
2:,7 Id.
2:1 Id. at 309.
2:1 Id. at 306, 308.
2, Id. at 310.
"4 Id.
242 Id.
1::, Id. at 311.
244 See supra note 165, at 406.
- 690 F.2d at 311. The court stated:
For almost two generations, the Convention's limits on liability have
been translatable into domestic currency values by application of a clear
and easily applied formula . . . . What the parties ask us to do is to
select, upon the basis of our judgment as to what is best as a matter of
policy, a new unit of conversion. We are without authority to do so.
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tive" to propose a new treaty and have the judiciary witness
its ratification without intervention.246 Until such time as
political resolution of the gold issue is achieved, the court
held that the Convention's limitations on liability for losses of
cargo were unenforceable in U.S. courts.247 Frank/in Mzn's
holding was made prospectively applicable to events creating
liability 60 days from the issuance of the mandate of
unenforceability. 24
8
TWA filed a petition for a Writ of Certiorari249 on the
grounds that the Second Circuit had abrogated the Warsaw
Convention by nullifying the liability limitation provisions.25 °
By so holding, TWA argued further, the Second Circuit acted
beyond its constitutional powers and impermissibly infringed
upon the powers reserved to coordinate branches of the fed-
241; Id.
24I Id. Recently, in Maschinenfabrik Kern, A.G. v. Northwest Airlines, 562 F. Supp.
232 (N.D. Il. 1983), the same four alternative gold standards were suggested to the
district court. Id at 238. The district court reviewed the Franklin Mint decision but
refused to hold, even prospectively, that the article 22 liability limits were unenforce-
able. The district court criticized the Second Circuit's approach stating,
To conclude as the Second Circuit did in Franklin Mini that the action of
Congress in eliminating an official price of gold should operate to elimi-
nate all limitations of liability found in the Warsaw Convention reads
too much into an unrelated act of Congress. That act [the repeal of the
official price of gold, discussedsupra note 212] was intended to deal with
various monetary matters and only incidentally affected the provisions
of the Warsaw treaty. There is no reason to believe that Congress in-
tended to declare Article 22 obsolete.
Id. at 239. Instead, the district court utilized the last official price of gold as incorpo-
rated into the last, unrevised CAB limiting tariffs. Id; see id. at 238 for a discussion of
the CAB's role in determining the tariffs for limiting liability under article 22.
2 4 690 F.2d at 312. In cases already pending and events giving rise to liability
which occur before the 60 days would run, the court held that the last official price of
gold would be used to calculate the limits of liability. The issuance of the Second
Circuit's ruling which rendered the liability limitations unenforceable was to apply 60
days from the issuance of the mandate. The ruling was prospective in application
because of the compelling fact that "this is the first case in which a court has declined
to enforce the Convention's limits on liability." 690 F.2d at 311-12.
1-1 Petition of Trans World Airlines for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines,
525 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),aft'd, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982),cert. granted, 77 L.
Ed. 2d 1347 (1983) (No. 82-1186, January 15, 1983) [hereinafter TWA Petition]. The
United States Supreme Court heard oral argument in the Franklin Mint case on No-
vember 30, 1983.
2', Id
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eral government.25'
Franklin Mint did not respond to TWA's petition but, in-
stead, filed its own petition for a Writ of Certiorari on March
1, 1983.252 Franklin Mint offered two reasons why certiorari
should be granted. First, the case concerns an important
question of federal law, namely the judicial power to abro-
gate the provisions of an international treaty.253 Second, the
federal courts are in conflict over the interpretation of article
22 of the Warsaw Convention.254
-" Id TWA took the position that both its and Franklin Mint's petitions should be
granted. TWA Petition, supra note 249, at 5. The judicial disarray which the Supreme
Court must resolve is raised in both petitions and each petition on its own "entails
consideration of the issues raised by TWA." United States Brief, tufra note 254, at 17.
However, when the most significant issue for Supreme Court review emerges, namely
whether "the Second Circuit exceeded its power by nullifying a treaty to which the
United States is a party" (TWA Brief, supra note 249, at 5), then TWA should be
treated as the petitioner because it argues for reversal of the Second Circuit's prospec-
tive decision. Id
252 Petition of the Franklin Mint Corporation for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World
Airlines, 525 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), afa, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
77 L. Ed. 2d 1347 (1983) (No. 82-1465, March 1, 1983) [hereinafter Franklin Mint
Petition].
On March 7, 1983 Franklin Mint was requested by the United States Supreme
Court to file a reponse to TWA's original Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. The re-
sponse of Franklin Mint was filed on April 5, 1983.
21:1 Franklin Mint Petition, supra note 252, at 5.
254 Id. at 3, 7. In addition to the petitions filed by the two parties to the litigation,
four non-parties filed amicus curiae briefs. On January 20, 1983, the International Air
Transport Association (IATA) and forty-three of its member airlines filed an amicae
curiae brief in support of TWA's Petition. In the alternative, IATA petitioned for leave
to intervene. Petition of International Air Transport Association (IATA) for Leave to
Intervene in Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 525 F. Supp. 1288
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), aft 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1347 (1983)
(No. 82-1186, Jan. 20, 1983); Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit or, in the Alternative, Brief of Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari of Trans World Airlines, Franklin Mint
Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 525 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 690 F.2d 303
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1347 (1983) [hereinafter IATA Petition].
IATA's Amicus Brief asserts, inter a/a, that the Second Circuit has violated the
constitutional separation of powers doctrine by its jurisdictional intervention into the
conduct of foreign relations. The IATA Petition acknowledged forthrightly that a re-
quest to intervene before the United States Supreme Court is unusual. IATA Petition,
supra, at 11. To justify its intervention, IATA utilized'a broad-based argument that
encompasses Frankhn Mint's effect on all of its 123 international members. Id at 12.
Because these members conduct their daily operations in reliance upon the Warsaw
Convention, the Second Circuit's decision (if permitted to stand) would disrupt the
entire international framework thereby hampering international commerce. Id at 12-
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The broad-based argument advanced in TWA's position
never attacked the judgment of the Second Circuit.255 In-
stead, TWA only attacked the prospective aspect of the rul-
ing.256 Because a money judgment was issued to Franklin
Mint, the holding by the Second Circuit which actually
bound the parties to that litigation was an affirmance of the
district court's judgment limiting TWA's liability to an
13. While the issue raised by IATA is an integral part of any in-depth analysis of the
Convention's liability limitations, its petition was denied by the Supreme Court.
On February 7, 1983, the Air Transport Association of America (ATA) filed an
amicuscuriae brief in both TWA's and Franklin Mint's petitions. Brief of Air Transport
Association of America (ATA) as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petition of Trans
World Airlines for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 525 F. Supp. 1288
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), af'd, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1347 (1983)
(No. 82-1186, February 7, 1983) [hereinafter ATA Brief].
On April 7, 1983, the United States filed an amzcus curiae brief in both TWA's and
Franklin Mint's petitions urging the Court to grant both parties' petitions. Brief of the
United States as Amicus Curiae on Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World
Airlines, 525 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aft'd, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
77 L. Ed. 2d 1347 (1983) (Nos. 82-1186 and 82-1465 April 7, 1983) [hereinafter United
States Brief]. The United States takes the position that the repeal of the Par Value
Modification Act in 1978, discursed supra note 212 and accompanying text, did not ab-
rogate the liability limitation established by article 22 of the Convention. Hence, the
Second Circuit was wrong in concluding that with the repeal, Congress had specifically
rejected use of the $42.22 per troy ounce of gold standard to implement article 22.
Conversion at this rate, argued the United States, would effectuate the manifest pur-
pose of the contracting nations. United States Brief, supra, at 11-13.
Finally, on October 12, 1983, two plaintiffs whose decedents were killed as a result
of a crash of a Korean Air Lines (KAL) Boeing 747 aircraft at Kimpo International
Airport at the end of a Trans-Pacific flight on November 18, 1980 filed an amzius curiae
brief. Brief of Amicus Curiae Mark Hammerschlag and Ellen Van Fleet in Support of
Franklin Mint Corp., Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 525 F. Supp. 1288
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), aft'd, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1347 (1983)
(Nos. 82-1186 and 82-1465, October 12, 1983) [hereinafter Kimpo Plaintiffs' Brief].
The wrongful death litigation arising out of that crash is pending in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California. Hammerschlag v. Korean Air
Lines, 558 F. Supp. 72 (C.D. Cal. 1983),sub nom. In re Aircrash at Kimpo International
Airport on November 18, 1980, 558 F. Supp. 72 (C.D. Cal. 1983). The Kimpo plain-
tiffs argued that as strong as the Frank/in Mint decision is in holding article 22 unen-
forceable in a cargo loss, it is even stronger when examined in the context of death and
personal injury claims. Kimpo Plaintiffs' Brief, supra, at 5. See infra note 269 and ac-
companying text for further discussion of the Kimpo litigation and its relation to the
Second Circuit's decision in Frankh Mint.
'" TWA Petition, supra note 249.
SId.
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amount calculated at the rate of $42.22 per ounce of gold.257
This had been one of the standards of conversion advocated
by TWA itself.258 In effect, TWA only sought review of the
legal rule which the Second Circuit announced for applica-
tion tofiuture cases. 21
9
The amicus curiae brief filed by the United States Solicitor
General pointed out the importance of appealing the Second
Circuit decision as it related to the parties to the instant liti-
gation. Arguably, TWA presented no actual controversy to
the Supreme Court. 260  Nevertheless, the issues which
emerged out of the district court's holding were raised in
Franklin Mint's petition and, as the Solicitor General argued,
resolution of those issues entails consideration of the issues
raised by TWA.2 6' While this flaw in TWA's petition is not
likely to be dispositive of the Supreme Court's decision, it
seemingly would prevent TWA from claiming aggrieved
262party status.
On June 13, 1983, certiorari was granted to both TWA and
Franklin Mint. 261 While the effect of the Frankin Mint deci-
sion presently is stayed pending Supreme Court review, cer-
tain potential ramifications become imminently clear
through the treaty's looking glass. First, and most obvious,
Frankhn Mint exposes air carriers to unlimited liability in in-
ternational transportation to the extent that events giving rise
to liability are litigated in United States courts. Because the
Warsaw Convention and its progeny apply only to carriers
and not to manufacturers or other potential target defend-
ants in mass aviation disasters, the spill-over effect of this rule
is that a system is created whereby all claims will be chan-
nelled to the carrier. There will be no motivation to sue the
257 Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 525 F. Supp. 1288, 1289 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), aft'd, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1347 (1983).
2I Id. See supra notes 227-229 and accompanying text.
a". 690 F.2d at 311-12.
2'" United Stat.'s Brief, supra note 254, at 16.
,,,;, Id. at 17.
262 Id. at 16-17.
2- 77 L. Ed. 2d 1347 (1983) (No. 82-1186, Trans World Airlines, Petitioner; No. 82-
1465, Franklin Mint Corp., Petitioner).
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aircraft manufacturer or other parties, such as the United
States government because of the actions of the Federal Avia-
tion Administration (FAA) or the State Department. It will
be incumbent upon the carrier to then pursue other potential
defendants for contribution or indemnification, which will in-
evitably give rise to more extensive litigation among insurers
than if a plaintiff were to sue these other parties directly.
Second, there is nothing in the opinion to suggest that the
holding is limited to cargo cases. If it is not, then the limita-
tion of liability for the international carriage of passengers is
equally unenforceable. The Second Circuit demonstrated no
inclination toward limiting its holding to cargo cases. If any-
thing, it would seem that the motivation to render the mone-
tary limitations unenforceable would have been greater if the
court were facing a tragic loss of life rather than the loss of
cargo. As expected, the issue emerged shortly -after Frankhn
Mi'nt was decided by the Second Circuit. The District Court
for the Central District of California held the Warsaw Con-
vention limitations unenforceable in personal injury and
wrongful death cases in In re Aircrash at Kimpo International Air-
port, Korea, on November 18, 1980.264
Third, given Srats,2 65 one also wonders if the result in
Frank/hn Mint might have been different if Circuit Judge
Newman, the dissenter in Stratis, had participated in resolv-
ing the issue of article 22's enforceability. It seems that Judge
Newman would have taken the position that despite possible
unfairness and confusion among the courts, a practical appli-
cation of the Convention must be pursued as long as the
treaty remains in existence. Certainly, whether the issue is
ticket delivery or the conversion standard, the practical appli-
cation does not contemplate the type of treaty abrogation an-
nounced by the Second Circuit. As Judge Newman realized,
as long as the Warsaw Convention remains legislatively in-
tact, the judiciary must continue to work within its
parameters.
The fourth ramification of Frank/hn Mint is the implicit
' 558 F. Supp. 72 (C.D. Cal. 1983). See supra note 254; see also itnia note 269.
26 See supra notes 165-193 and accompanying text.
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unenforceability of the Montreal Agreement. As Judge
Sifton noted in In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on
March 14, 1980, "[tjhe Montreal Agreement was clearly in-
tended to operate within the framework and incorporate all the
relevant provisions of the Convention "266 Thus, by virtue of arti-
cle 23267 of the Warsaw Convention the provisions of the
Montreal Agreement setting forth the $75,000 limitation of
liability may be declared null and void in those cases where
damages exceed that sum. If the Warsaw Convention's limits
are unenforceable, the Montreal Agreement flies in the face
of Frankhn Mit because, if still enforceable by its own terms,
the Montreal Agreement sets a limit which contravenes the
unlimited liability established by the Second Circuit.
Fifth, the "wilful misconduct" exception to the liability
limitation remains, in a technical sense, unaffected and there-
fore intact after the Frankln Mint decision. In a footnote to
Frankln Mit, the Second Circuit stated that its holding was
limited to the enforceability of the liability limitations under
the Warsaw Convention and that it was expressing "no view
as to the severability of those limits from the rest of the Con-
vention. ' 268 Nevertheless, while Frankhn Mt does not ex-
pressly void the "wilful misconduct" exception, the
unenforceability of the limitation renders the need to estab-
lish "wilful misconduct" unnecessary. The Second Circuit
achieved, by implication, what the Montreal Protocols would
have accomplished in specific legislative terms.
As the Warsaw Convention now stands, aside from Frankhn
Mint, the mere threat of a "wilful misconduct" finding by the
jury is sufficient motivation for the carrier to negotiate to-
ward high settlement value of cases above the $75,000 limit.
- 535 F. Supp. at 839 (emphasis added).
2,31 Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 23(1). Article 23(1) of the Warsaw Con-
vention provides that:
[Alny contractual provision which fixes a lower limit than that which is
laid down in this convention shall be null and void, but the nullity of
any such provision shall not involve the nullity of the whole contract,
which shall remain subject to the provisions of this convention.
Id
690 F.2d at 311 n.27.
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The elimination of the threat of a wilful misconduct finding
would also eliminate the examination of the airlines' opera-
tion and performance. The carrier, as the targeted defend-
ant, will be faced with unlimited liability and will be
dismissed from scrutiny at the same time.269
Sixth, if the Second Circuit's methodology is valid, then
the judiciary may have taken the power to abrogate interna-
tional laws under the guise of "treaty interpretation". It is at
least arguable that the Second Circuit properly exercised its
constitutional responsibility to interpret the Warsaw Conven-
tion. °  In implementing this responsibility, it determined
that the Warsaw Convention conflicted with a subsequent act
of Congress, the 1976 Bretton Woods Agreement Act
2 7 1
which repealed the Par Value Modification Act.272 If the Par
Value Modification Act's repeal did abolish the official price
26 558 F. Supp. 72 (C.D. Cal. 1983). The first judicial realization of this came from
the United States District Court for the Central'District of California on February 15,
1983. The case involved consolidated wrongful death actions which arose out of the
1980 Korean Air Lines crash near Seoul, Korea. The plaintiffs sought to strike Korean
Air Lines' limitation of liability defense on the basis of insufficient notice of the limita-
tion to the particular flight; alternatively, plaintiffs argued that, if the treaty applied,
then the measure of recovery would be computed based upon the free market price of
gold. Offering virtually no remarks on the merits of the plaintiffs' first contention, the
district court went directly to the gold issue and decided it broadly as in Franklin Mnt,
stating, "The well-reasoned, comprehensive Franklin Mint opinion has persuaded this
Court that, indeed, the limitation on damages that is imposed by the [Warsaw] Con-
vention is unenforceable." 558 F. Supp. at 74-75.
With respect to Franklin Mint's effect on the Montreal Agreement, the Court
agreed that the very concern of the Montreal meeting in 1975 represented the Warsaw
Convention Signatories' recognition that the Convention's unit had been eliminated.
The court stated:
It is clearly established that the airlines knew that "a rational limit on
liability cannot exist" without an internationally agreed upon unit
... . Therefore, airlines, including Korean, presumptively knew that
this 'international disarray' would prevent the Convention from shield-
ing them in any rational manner, and they would be expected to protect
themselves and obtain additional insurance.
558 F. Supp. at 75. The Ninth Circuit denied Korean Air Lines' petition for permis-
sion to appeal the district court's interlocutory decision. In re Air Crash at Kimpo Int'l
Airport, Korea, on November 19, 1980, 558 F. Supp. 72 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (No. 83-
8051, May 2, 1983).
21,, Kimpo Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 254, at 5-6.
- See supra notes 203-206 and accompanying text.
272 See supra notes 209-212 and accompanying text.
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of gold, as the Second Circuit held,273 then the effective date
of the repeal placed the Warsaw Convention liability limita-
tion in direct conflict with the Bretton Woods Agreement.274
The other side of the coin to this argument in support of
the Second Circuit's ruling is that the 1976 Repeal Act and
its legislative history make no reference to the Warsaw Con-
275vention. The treaty will not be deemed to be abrogated by
a later statute unless such a Congressional purpose has been
clearly expressed.276 The latter argument, grounded in fun-
damental principles established by the Founding Fathers,277
should prove to be the sounder of the two when the Supreme
Court renders its decision in the case. If the Court is to rule
that article 22 has properly been abrogated, the vehicle it will
utilize to reach such a conclusion would hardly derive from
the argument that an act of Congress has overridden the
Warsaw Convention.
C. Concluding Remarks.
The Second Circuit's decision will cause reverberations in
courts across the country and subject various disciplines to
new policy considerations. The aviation and insurance in-
dustries, intertwined as they inevitably must be when faced
with an air crash disaster arising out of international trans-
portation, must re-assess the respective roles of "insured" and
"insurer." With a channelling of all claims to the air carrier
who is now faced with unlimited liability, the cost to the car-
rier's insurer may increase to cover the greater risk involved.
21., 690 F.2d at 308.
27- Kimpo Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 254, at 10-11.
21r, Brief of Trans World Airlines, on Writs of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit at 15-20, Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Air-
lines, 525 F. Supp. 1288, (S.D.N.Y. 1981), af, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 77
L. Ed. 2d 1347 (1983) (Nos. 82-1186 and 82-1465, August 29, 1983) [hereinafter TWA
Brieq.
211i Id. at 16.
277 It must surely be assumed that Congress was aware of the requirement, under
article 39(2) of the Convention, that a signatory desiring to withdraw from the Con-
vention must provide its treaty partners with six months' notice of its intended with-
drawal and that Congress would not knowingly ignore this express treaty obligation of
the United States. See J. Jay, THE FEDERALIST No. 64 at 424 (B. Wright ed. 1961)
citedrn TWA Brief, supra note 275, at 18-19.
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If this, in turn, puts the insurer at greater exposure than it
would have with the survival of the limited liability provision
under Warsaw, then the conflict for counsel hired by the in-
surer to protect the interests of the insured is also severely
affected. Members of the defense bar must evaluate whose
interests are really at issue, those from whom they have re-
ceived their instructions, the insurer, or the commercial entity
they are supposed to defend in the litigation. These respec-
tive interests are often neither parallel nor symmetrical.
From the aircraft manufacturer's standpoint in litigation
after Frankzn Mni, the channelling of all liability claims to
the carrier will provoke more insurance battles between the
insurers of the carrier and the manufacturer, primarily over
the issue of apportioning the liability among them. Sensible
discussions would be preferable to litigating these issues.
However, it cannot be denied that idealism yields to the real-
ity of the inherent conflicts which separate the carrier and the
manufacturer when settlement funds must be put on the
table.
As the insurers enter the picture when apportionment
emerges as the primary issue, the conflict of insuring risks be-
comes of grave concern. Because most of the liability risks
are underwritten not by one insurer but by many over whom
that risk is safely spread, it is not unusual for an insurer who
has a "piece" of the carrier's risk to also have underwritten a
portion of the manufacturer's risk. If Frank/in Mi'n foreshad-
ows a proliferation of apportionment-type litigation among
various defendants, the conflict of the insurer's interests envi-
sions the same money put up at both ends of the negotiating
table. The scenario is such that the insurer's negotiating fo-
rum becomes a roundtable where all the money which is put
up comes from the same pockets. Whether this will open the
door to a more pragmatic resolution of how to allocate each
defendant's risk or will create an even more litigious posture
than already exists in the United States courts remains to be
seen, pending the final outcome of Frankin Mini and its effect
on the Warsaw Convention.
1983]
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V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OVER WARSAW
A. The Ba/i Decision.
In Franklin Mint, the Second Circuit arguably left intact all
the provisions of the Warsaw Convention other than the arti-
cle 22 liability limitation.278  Recently, in In re Air Crash in
Bai, Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 279 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals examined whether the existence of the treaty is possi-
ble, in practical terms, without the implementation of article
22. Whereas the judicial progression from the Mertens -Warren-
Lisi trilogy through Frank/in Mint 280 circumvented the liabil-
ity limitation through specific provisions of the Warsaw Con-
vention, in Ba/i the Ninth Circuit intimated in dicta that a
constitutional criterion may make the entire Warsaw Con-
vention unenforceable.
In Ba/', wrongful death litigation arose out of the crash of a
Pam Am Boeing 707 which flew into a mountain near Bali,
Indonesia.28' When the aircraft began its descent to Bali
under a dark sky, the crew lost sight of their approach mark-
ers. 282 Instead of ascending to their former, higher altitude
the crew remained at a very low altitude and crashed into the
mountain.283 Numerous lawsuits were filed in several federal
district courts throughout the United States. 2 4 After they
were filed, all the suits were consolidated in the United
States District Court for the Central District of California
pursuant to an order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation.285
Wrongful death suits on behalf of three passengers were
27" The court noted that the Warsaw Convention established limited liability. The
holding in Frank/in Mint was limited solely to the unenforceability of the limits and
expressed no view as to the severability of those limits from the rest of the Convention.
Frankh Mint, 690 F.2d at 311 n.27.
279 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982) (also referred to as Causey v. Pan Am. World
Airways).
2- See supra text of Parts II, III and IV, at notes 55-345.






tried to a jury.26 The verdict returned was that Pan Am was
guilty of negligence but not wilful misconduct in the opera-
tion of the aircraft.2" 7 Therefore, the jury's determination did
not preclude the carrier from invoking the limitation of liabil-
ity defense. 88
The trial was bifurcated so that all issues relating to the
carrier's limitation of liability and other defenses under the
Warsaw Convention were deferred until after the jury re-
turned its verdict. 28 9 Based upon its finding of negligence
against Pan Am, the jury awarded each plaintiff a sum of
money in disregard of and in excess of the $75,000 limitation
set by the Montreal Agreement. 290 Because of the bifurcation,
the jury's determination that Pan Am was not guilty of wilful
misconduct left open the issue whether the damages awarded
would be limited by the terms of the Warsaw Convention
and the Montreal Agreement. 9
Unlike Lot, Stratis, and Frankhn Mtt, there was no issue
before the California District Court that related to a specific
provision of either the Warsaw Convention or the Montreal
Agreement. There were no factual issues presented concern-
ing the size of ticket print, the proper delivery of a ticket for
international transportation, or the proper unit of account to
convert gold into United States dollars.292 Yet, after the jury
returned its verdict, the district court transcended that judi-
cial progression which fostered piecemeal circumvention of
the article 22 liability limitation and ruled that under Cali-
fornia law a decedent could not contractually compromise his
survivor's right to wrongful death recovery.293 Accordingly,
the trial court held that the contractual limitations imposed
by the Warsaw Convention could not be invoked against a
a; id.
207 684 F.2d at 1306.
2M See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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passenger's next of kin.294
As a result of its threshold characterization of the treaty as
a contract which limited the rights of those not in privity to
it, the district court never reached the plaintiffs' challenge to
the constitutionality of the Convention.295 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit, however, held that the Warsaw Convention
preempted California law to the extent that California law
would prevent the application of the treaty's limitation of lia-
bility. 296 It was this preemption of state law which exposed
the Warsaw Convention to constitutional scrutiny.29 7 The
Ninth Circuit, however, did not pass on the Convention's
constitutionality because it found an alternative remedy in
the Court of Claims jurisdiction to determine whether the
Convention's liability limitation constituted a taking of prop-
erty without just compensation.298
The constitutional challenge advanced by the plaintiffs
consisted of three points. First, they argued that the Warsaw
Convention was "so arbitrary and unreasonable" as to de-
prive them of substantive due process.2 99 Second, they sub-
mitted that the treaty deprived them of equal protection of
the laws.3 °° Third, they contended that it impermissibly re-
stricted their constitutional right to travel.3 '
The court dismissed the first two prongs of the plaintiffs'
attack by analogizing the Warsaw Convention to domestic
legislation which limits liability for injury resulting from nu-
clear power plant accidents. 2 The Ninth Circuit stated that
like the Price-Anderson Act,30 3 the Warsaw Convention is an
economic regulation under the commerce clause that is not
N4 Id
2" 684 F.2d at 1306.
211i Id. at 1307-08. See infa note 326.
rn Id at 1308-13.
2w Id. at 1310-13. See infra notes 315-329 and accompanying text.




: 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976). The Price-Anderson Act sets a maximum limitation of
recoverable damages for liability arising out of a nuclear power plant accident.
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unconstitutional unless it is arbitrary or unreasonable.30 4 Cit-
ing a decision which upheld the constitutionality of the Price-
Anderson Act,30 5 the court inferred that the Warsaw Con-
vention would be constitutional unless arbitrary or unreason-
able. °6 In drawing this inference, however, the Ninth Circuit
never determined whether the Warsaw Convention was arbi-
trary or unreasonable, 30 7 because of the alternate remedy in
the Court of Claims.
3 0 8
Turning its attention to the plaintiffs' third point of attack,
the Ninth Circuit explained the plaintiffs' constitutional ar-
gument that the Warsaw Convention's low liability limits re-
stricted their decedents' right to travel.3 09 First, the court
reiterated case law holding that any restriction imposed upon
the right to travel must be carefully tailored to serve a sub-
stantial and legitimate government interest 31° and must not
constitute a penalty on the exercise of that right; otherwise
such limitations would be a direct restriction.3 1 The court
reiterated the plaintiffs' arguments that the Convention's low
liability limits so burdened the right to travel as to be a pen-
alty on the exercise of the right.3 2 Although the court de-
684 F.2d at 1309.
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
684 F.2d at 1309.
:7 M.
- See infta notes 315-329 and accompanying text.
- 684 F.2d at 1309-10. The court found international travel was a fundamental
right, like interstate travel. Id (citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1965);
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1968); Kent v. Dulles, 375 U.S.
116, 126 (1958)).
- 684 F.2d at 1309 (citing Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 507-08
(1964)).
:.. 684 F.2d at 1309-10 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969)).
The Ninth Circuit was not troubled by the plaintiffs' need to assert third party consti-
tutional rights, their decedents' right to travel, which was burdened by the Conven-
tion's liability limits. The court stated in passing that "this may be one of the cases in
which constitutional rights can be successfully protected only if interested third parties
are permitted to raise them." 684 F.2d at 1310 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 481 (1965)). The Ninth Circuit considered these plaintiffs, the survivors of
the crash victims, .to be adequate third parties to raise their decedents' constitutional
rights. The court stated, "Surely penalties that would be unconstitutional if imposed
on the traveler himself cannot be validly imposed on his survivors, simply because they
were not the ones who sought to exercise the right." 684 F.2d at 1310.
.1,2 684 F.2d at 1310. The plaintiffs argued that the support for the rationale behind
the Warsaw Convention's liability limits had changed drastically between 1934 and
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scribed the plaintiffs' arguments as "persuasive" and
"substantial, ' ' 313 the Ninth Circuit abstained from reaching
the constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention because of an
alternate remedy available to the plaintiffs.3 14
Having abstained from deciding the plaintiffs' three consti-
tutional attacks on the Warsaw Convention, the Ninth Cir-
cuit proceeded to chart the course which the plaintiffs could
take to launch their alternate remedy, a "takings" claim.
The court reasoned that once the plaintiffs had obtained a
money judgment against the defendant airline, the plaintiffs
had a property interest that could not be taken for public use
without just compensation given to the owner of that prop-
erty right.3 5 If the trial court lowered the plaintiffs' money
judgment to the Warsaw Convention's liability limits, a "tak-
ing" under the fifth amendment may have occurred.1 6 Be-
cause "takings" cases turn on the degree of governmental
impairment of a private property right,31 7 the plaintiffs must
seek a determination in the Court of Claims whether their
loss of the amount of the judgment exceeding the Conven-
tion's limit is justly compensable under the provisions of the
Tucker Act.3 8
the present, and the treaty presently does not protect a government interest or benefit
United States citizens who travel internationally. Id
:11Id
:11 Id
- 684 F.2d at 1312. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 245 (1796).
- 684 F.2d at 1312.
'"' Id (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
'" 28 U.S.C. § 1491. The Tucker Act provides:
The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon
any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitu-
tion, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive depart-
ment, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or
for liquidated damages or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding
in tort. For the purpose of this paragraph, an express or implied con-
tract with the Army and Air Force Exchanges ...or Exchange Coun-
cils of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall be
considered an express or implied contract with the United States. To
provide an entire remedy and to complete the relief afforded by the
judgment, the court may, as an incident of and collateral to any such
judgment, issue orders directing restoration to office or position, place-
ment in appropriate duty or retirement status, and correction of applica-
ble records, and such orders may be issued to any appropriate official of
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In reaching its conclusion that the Warsaw limit may be a
"taking" under the fifth amendment, the Ninth Circuit did
not mention the requirement that the governmental regula-
tion causing the "taking" be for a public use, but the court
did examine the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. 319 The
court noted that rights created by or dependent on treaties
were excepted from the Court of Claims' jurisidiction, under
the "treaty exception".3 0 To circumvent the treaty excep-
tion, the court relied on Dames &Moore v. Regan,321 in which
the Supreme Court deferred to the Court of Claims "takings"
claims which resulted from the United States' Executive
Agreement with Iran to secure the release of American hos-
tages.322 Just as did the Ninth Circuit in Bab', the Supreme
Court in Dames & Moore did not hold that a "taking" had
the United States. In any case within its jurisdiction, the court shall
have the power to remand appropriate matters to any administrative or
executive body or official with such direction as it may deem proper and
just.
Nothing herein shall be construed to give the Court of Claims jurisdic-
tion in suits against, or founded on actions of, the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority, nor to amend or modify the provisions of the Tennessee Valley
Authority Act of 1933, as amended, with respect to suits by or against
the Authority.
Id For a detailed discussion of the Tucker Act, see 1 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.65 [2.-3] (2d ed. 1981).
1.9 684 F.2d at 1311.
12, 28 U.S.C. § 1502 (1976).
:12, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
:122 Id. at 660-68. In response to the seizure of American personnel as hostages at the
American Embassy in Tehran, Iran, President Carter, pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1976 & Supp. III
1979), declared a national emergency on November 14, 1979, and froze the removal or
transfer of all property and interests in property held by the Government of Iran which
were subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The Treasury Department then
issued implementing regulations providing that "[u]nless licensed or authorized . . .
any attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial pro-
cess is null and void with respect to any property in which on or since [November 14,
1979] there existed an interest of Iran" and that any licenses or authorizations granted
could be "amended, modified, or revoked at any time." The President then granted a
general license that authorized certain judicial proceedings, including pre-judgment
attachments, against Iran but did not allow the entry of any judgment or decree. On
December 19, 1979, petitioner Dames & Moore filed suit in federal district court
against the Government of Iran the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and a
number of Iranian banks, alleging that it was owed a certain amount of money for
services performed under a contract with the Atomic Energy Organization. Id at 662-
64.
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been effected nor could it properly make such a determina-
tion. 3  Both courts reasoned that it was inappropriate to ad-
dress the contention of a "taking" and properly deferred the
issue to the jurisdiction of the United States Court of
Claims.
324
The Ninth Circuit further reasoned that the narrow 325
treaty exception did not apply because the wrongful death
causes of action in Bak' arose under California law, not the
Warsaw Convention. 26 Arguably, the Warsaw Convention
creates a cause of action, 327 and the rights asserted are depen-
dent upon the treaty itself which would prevent the Court of
Claims from taking jurisdiction. Several circuit courts have
recently held that the Convention creates a cause of action,
the Ninth Circuit among them. The Ninth Circuit in Bali,
however, distinguished between the treaty as the source of a
cause of action and the treaty as limiting plaintiffs to a cause
of action created by the treaty itself.328  Under the former
view, a plaintiff could choose to sue under the Convention or
under another cause of action. The better view is that the
Convention limits the amount of recovery rather than creates
the right to assert the claim brought in Ba/i.329
;23 Id at 688-89. The Supreme Court's thirty page opinion contains less than one full
page devoted to the subject of a "taking". Id
:12, 453 U.S. at 688; 684 F.2d at 1311-13.
1'- The court noted that the Court of Claims itself narrowly construed the treaty
exception. 684 F.2d at 1311 (citing Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 889,
902-06 (Ct. Cl. 1976)).
:'2,i 684 F.2d at 1311. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's holding that the
Convention did not preempt California law. The district court had reasoned that the
plaintiffs, as survivors of the decedent crash victims, were not in privity with the air-
line. As such, the district court determined that, under California law, the contractual
limits on recovery in the Warsaw Convention could not limit recovery on a tort claim
to those not in privity with the contracting parties. 684 F.2d at 1306. The Ninth
Circuit reversed, holding that Congress intended, by the overall scheme of the Warsaw
Convention, to preempt state law allowing unlimited liability. Id at 1307-08. Implic-
itly, the court of appeals concluded that state wrongful death laws were part of the
state legislation which Congress intended not to preempt. See id. at 1307 and 1311 n.8.
:, Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 918-19 (2d Cir. 197 8),cerl.
denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979). The Ninth Circuit recently followed Benjamins in In re
Mexico City Aircrash of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1983).
684 F.2d at 1311 n.8.
See Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d 1256, 1258 n.2 (9th
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B. Concluding Remarks.
In Bah', the Ninth Circuit lent its credibility to four consti-
tutional arguments regarding the Warsaw Convention. 3 0 Al-
though the court carefully explained each argument, it did
so only in dicta.33 1 The specific holding of Bali is only that
the Court of Claims has jurisdiction to adjudicate the "tak-
ings" claims which plaintiffs could bring.332 The Ninth Cir-
cuit did not hold that a "taking" had occurred,333 that the
plaintiffs' decedent's right to travel was restricted by the Con-
vention's low liability limits,3 34 or that the liability limits are
arbitrary or unreasonable so as to violate substantive due pro-
cess or the equal protection clause. 5
The Ninth Circuit's map for a "takings" claim places sev-
eral burdens on plaintiffs. According to the court, plaintiffs
must prosecute to judgment their cause of action against an
international air carrier and obtain a judgment in excess of
the Warsaw Convention's limits.3 36 The plaintiff must expe-
rience the trial court's imposition of the Convention's limits
on the judgment, lowering the amount of the judgment. 7
Only then, and after the expiration of any appeals, when the
judgment becomes final, does the plaintiff have a claim for a
"taking" without just compensation .3 3  According to the
Ninth Circuit, the statute of limitation begins to run from the
time the judgment becomes final 33 and the plaintiff must
prosecute a second action in the Court of Claims.34 In this
second action, the plaintiff must defeat a "treaty exception"
objection to the Court of Claims' jurisdiction. Additionally,
Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977); see also Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 4,
at 516-19.
330 See supra notes 278-329 and accompanying text.
:,:,, 684 F.2d at 1313.
132 Id.
m3 Id at 312. See supra notes 315-329 and accompanying text.
'M' 684 F.2d at 1310. See supra notes 309-314 and accompanying text.
684 F.2d at 1309-10. See supra notes 302-306 and accompanying text.
684 F.2d at 1312.
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the plaintiff bears the heavy burden of proving a "taking."
The plaintiff may obtain the full amount of the original ver-
dict after additional years, procedural difficulties and great
expense.
Clearly, the issue of "taking" would have been ripe for ad-
judication before the Court of Claims in Dames & Moore be-
cause the property right of the petitioners was infringed upon
to the direct benefit and public use of the United States.34'
Bali and other Warsaw tort claims, however, are dissimilar to
the circumstances which raised the "takings" issue in Dames &
Moore. It is difficult to see how the Convention's liability lim-
itation serves a public use or benefits the United States when,
as the Ninth Circuit noted in Bali, "[t]he United States itself
doesn't assert a national interest in limiting liabilityper se. In
fact, continuing efforts are being made by the United States
to raise or dispense with the limitations altogether. '34 2 As
such, the attempt to scrutinize the Warsaw liability limita-
tion in light of the Tucker Act disregards the intent and
meaning of the concept of "taking". The Ninth Circuit's in-
troduction of the Tucker Act into cases involving Warsaw
Convention limitations is incongruous with the import of the
constitutional protection which it attempts to challenge.
Needless to say, there will be further judicial interpretation of
the Ninth Circuit decision in Bahi
PART VI
THE FUTURE
The Warsaw Convention has outgrown the paternalistic
guise of the aviation industry. We have witnessed a recurring
struggle by United States courts to reconcile historical pro-
gress with a treaty which places artificial monetary values on
the loss of life. This is the real crisis with which the judiciary
is left to grapple, from the technical intricacies of what consti-
tutes proper ticket "delivery", through the gold mesh, to the
- Dames & Moore v. Reagan, 453 U.S. at 689, discussed supra note 321 and accom-
panying text.
:,2 684 F.2d at 1310.
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newest vehicle toward circumvention of the treaty's limita-
tions - constitutional attack under the guise of a "taking".
The varied conclusions reached by United States courts in
recent Warsaw/Montreal cases collectively have taken on the
appearance of a serpentine judicial progression, wrought with
confusion and inconsistency. Hopefully, when the United
States Supreme Court takes hold of the issues concerning
ticket delivery, the unenforceability of all standards of gold
conversion and the potentially unconstitutional "taking" cre-
ated by the Warsaw Convention limitations, a more definite,
unequivocal statement will emerge with respect to the viabil-
ity of the Warsaw Convention. Resolution of these issues by
the Supreme Court is necessary for at least the time being, so
as to diminish; if not destroy, the judicial disarray hanging
over this area of the law.
Supreme Court review notwithstanding, we must look be-
yond the final resolution of the serious issues currently exis-
tent as a result of cases such as LOT, Frankn Mint, and Ba/'.
To look no further than the final disposition of these cases
would be a myopic view. 43 The time is long overdue for a re-
interpretation of the goal of the treaty drafters in the light of
current affairs. Serious re-interpretation may well bring us to
the realization that the liability limitation under article 22 is
no longer justified.
The one message which the judiciary clearly has enunci-
ated in its bouts with the Warsaw Convention and its prog-
eny is that the time for a shift in theme is at the legislature's
doorstep. With the recent rejection of Montreal Protocols 3
& 4 by the Senate, the legislative input now needed is not a
further attempt toward ratification of the protocols but a re-
orientation toward practical uniformity to the extent it is de-
sired in the United States.344 Ratification of the Montreal
14. In the aftermath of the downing of Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight 007 over the
Sea of Japan on September 1, 1983, it is likely that all the issues which have been
generated by the Warsaw Convention over the past two decades will reemerge.
-4 In September, 1982, the International Law Association was presented with a
Draft Convention on an Integrated System of International Aviation Liability, the
purpose of which is to maintain but simplify the provisions of the present Warsaw
System. Among other changes, the Draft Convention does away with the limitation of
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Protocols does not fulfill this goal because it will always be
met with the resentment and opposition of those who have
carried the United States' long-standing dissatisfaction over
the liability limitation through history. The protocols pres-
ent the same ineffectual solution as occurred at the Hague in
1955, and, as such, their ratification would only serve to
widen the chasm between the United States and the rest of
the world.
A serious issue posed now to the international aviation
community is whether or not the Warsaw Convention regime
of liability limitations is still an effective system for governing
international air transportation in the United States. Pri-
marily because any individual limitation on liability for tor-
tious conduct is strongly disfavored by our judiciary, the
courts in the United States have demonstrated little reluc-
tance to avoid the Warsaw Convention liability limitation in
those cases where the damages sustained exceed the limita-
tion. The "ticket delivery" cases epitomize the courts' readi-
ness to circumvent the monetary ceiling; the "gold
controversy" is a direct outgrowth of the disfavor over the
limitations; and the emerging constitutional attack is the
forebearer of further devices constructed by the courts in the
a carrier's liability for death and personal injury; only limitations with respect to car-
riage of baggage and cargo are retained. The latter limitations are stated in terms of
SDR's at the day of judgment.
The concept of absolute liability is retained and further characterized as "secured"
liability by providing that the carrier shall maintain adequate insurance coverage to
the satisfaction of the nation into which the carrier operates. Other than this "se-
cured" liability concept, the Draft Convention does not expound upon how each na-
tional system would integrate on an international level. Wide discretion is given to
each nation to determine the scope of financial security to be procured by the carrier,
with the nation itself bearing the ultimate responsibility to make certain that the secur-
ity is sufficient to cover losses of life and personal injuries.
Insofar as the "wilful misconduct" exception of article 25 is concerned, the Draft
Convention makes the plaintiff's burden to overcome the liability limitation much
more difficult by requiring that he prove that the damage resulted from a wrongful act
or omission, done with the carrier's intent to cause damage.
The Draft Convention was prepared by Professor Bin Cheng, Chairman of the Inter-
national Law Association's Air Law Committee, together with Professor Jacqueline
Dutheil de la Rochere. No further action upon the Draft is known by this commenta-
tor to have taken place since originally presented in September, 1982. See LLOYD'S Av.
L., April 15, 1983, at 3-5.
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United States to side-step the undesirable effect of the War-
saw System.
If the Warsaw Convention's liability limitations are no
longer viable in the 1980's, then why should not the United
States be the forebearer of a new trend, indeed perhaps a new
treaty. This would allay the fears of Montreal Protocol pro-
ponents who express concern over the United States' loss of
prestige by not adopting Montreal Protocols 3 & 4. Senator
Hollings aptly addressed this "fear" during the March 7,
1983 Senate debate on ratification of the Protocols, declaring,
"What national prestige? I do not think there is anything
prestigious about this nonsense . . . . [If the protocols are
ratified], [w]e will become the international leader in a ripoff
of the American traveling public . . . .- Would there not
be more genuine prestige to be gained by shifting our thought
processes in the United States away from the "artificial respi-
rator" syndrome which would impose the Montreal Protocols
upon an already wavering foundation, and toward construc-
tion of an entirely new piece of legislation that not only gen-
erates uniformity for international air transportation but that
allows for the lack of it where needed as well. If our legisla-
tive branch of government is able and willing to get out of
the starting block in the direction of a refined treaty, then its
first step must be to stop the judicial stranglehold that is mu-
tilating the Warsaw Convention and its progeny. It must ac-
knowledge forthrightly that the uniformity of damages can
no longer be the Convention's cornerstone if it is serving to
foist arbitrary values on human life which cannot be justified.
With such an admission, at least a new course could be estab-
lished, and if the Warsaw Convention has been destined by
the death knell, it can at least be succeeded by the undertak-
ing of new treaty drafters rather than fade out in a whimper
through piecemeal judicial destruction.
.5 129 CONG. REC. S2250 (daily ed. March 7, 1983).
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